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PREFACE 
In criticizi_ng any approach to a ;problem, such as the problem of 
perception, it is necessary to single out some advocate of that 
approach. I have selected a contemporary psychofogist, John Beloff, 
who seems to hold a theory of perception which has some popularity 
amo_ng psychologists and which I shall argue thro_ughout this paper is 
untenable. The theory is known as a Representative Theory or Causal 
Theory of Perception. In presenti_ng any position and criticizi_ng it 
there is always the danger of misrepresentation. There have been times 
in trying to give an accurate account of Beloff's theory that I have 
been perplexed at just what to say. In these cases I have taken the 
liberty of filli_ng in details not explicitly stated by Beloff himself. 
If in doi_ng so there is any misrepresentation of his theory it has not 
been intentional, but rather due to my lack of understanding. 
In writing a thesis, as anyone who has can verify, a great deal of 
advice is needed; especially in the early stages. For it seems that 
the novice writer, such as I am, lacks fars_ightedness into the extent 
of the subject upon which he embarks. In regard to this I wish to 
express my deep appreciation to Dr. Thomas C. Mayberry, my thesis 
adviser, for his help in my selecting a topic which could be handled 
in a master's thesis of reasonable le_ngth. Likewise, I owe a debt of 
tha:'flkS to hi.m for his assistance throughout the writing of this paper; 
for_ generoµsl)'. givi_ng of his time and immediate attention to the var-
ious problems I have encountered. 
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I would also like to acknowledge a debt to the entire faculty of 
the Philosophy Department here at Oklahoma State University, for during 
my studies they have impressed me as a rather outstanding group of 
teachers. Each of them has had an influence on my philosophical out-
look, and in this I stand in their debt. 
Finally, I would.like to express my appreciation to my mother and 
sister who have given their time to type the various drafts which must 
precede a finished paper. 
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Perception, to most people in their ordinary daily lives, is no 
problem. We all are familiar with experiences of seeing, hearing, feel-
ing, smelling and tasting and .have no difficulty in reporting what we 
see, hear, feel, smell and taste. Although most people are, for the 
most part, unaware of the physiological processes involved in perceiv-
ing, they feel that there cannot be any question that we perceive things 
and events in the external world and that our senses can be trusted to 
reveal the external world to us in the way that it is. ijut some phi-
losophers have not found these commonsense views so obvious, some even 
hold such views to be mistaken. They hold that to perceive something 
is not to be aware of the kinds of things we normally think of our-
selves as perceiving - books, typewriters, mountains and hillsides -
but is rather to be in some sense aware of mental entities which have 
been given a variety of names; ideas, sensations, sense-impressions, 
sense-data, percepts, etc., which do not exist in the.world around us 
as we suppose them to, but instead "exist" in our minds. 1 One such 
person is John Beloff whose attack on these commonsense views and whose 
approach and solution to the concept of perception is the subject of 
this paper. 
It may occur to one to ask why philosophers should be interested 
in perception. Well, 'philosophy is concerned with the examination of 
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and clarification of concepts, and "perception" bei.ng a concept, we can, 
as philosophers, invest.igate it. There seem to be two routes by which 
a philosopher can be led to discuss perception. One is the route from 
the Philosophy of Mind and the other is from Epistemol.ogy or the Theory 
2 of Knowle.dge. Warnock thinks it unfortunate that most philosophers 
who discuss perception do so from one of the two above approaches be-
cause it has interest in its own right. 3 It appears unfortunate only 
to the extent that treatment of perception as a subtopic to some other 
broader philosophical concern may obscure the importance of the topic 
of perception. My main concern in this thesis is with perception it-
self and not so much its implications for other areas of philosophy; 
altho.ugh, as we shall see in what follows, Beloff does approach the 
problem from the direction of the Philosophy of Mind. · 
To begin with, we must come to some understandi.ng of what we are 
talki.ng about when we use some technical terms. One such term is 
"perception." I shall accept Don Locke's definition of "perceive." 
He defines "perceive" as the genus of which "see," "hear," "taste," 
"smell," and "feel" are the species. 4 Thus, to ask what it is to per-
ceive somethi.ng is to ask what it is to see, hear, taste., smell, or 
feel somethi.ng; and similarly, to ask what is perceived when we per-
cei ve somethi.ng is to ask what it is we see, hear, taste, sme 11, or 
feel when we perform these acts. Terms like "percept" and "physical 
objec.t" will arise in the course of this work and these will be defined 
as they arise according to the theory in which they occur. 
I now wish to discuss in more detail the subject of the present 
work. The position under scrutiny will be that held by John Beloff in 
The Existence of Mind, which is a form of a Represen.tative or Causal 
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Theory of Perception. His purpose .in this book for discussi.ng percep-
tion is that of elaborati.ng his philosophy of mind, which is dualistic. 
He states the thesis of the .book in this manner: II . . Mind exists, . 
or, to be more explicit, that minds, mental entities and mental phenom-
ena exist as ultimate constituents of the world in which we live. 115 
Perception is commonly held to be a source of knowle.dge; and. accordi.ng 
to Beloff all perceptual.knowledge is knowledge of mental entities, 
thus his overall thesis that mental entities are ultimate.constituents 
of the world is supported. 
Beloff, of course, does not simply decide in favor of perceptual 
dualism because it supports his mind body dualism, he advances arguments 
to demonstrate that a Representative Theory must.be accepted. His 
approach is as follows. There are three possible soluti.ons. to a ques-
tion concerning the nature of what we perceive. One is Phenomenalism. 
Beloff identifies this view with Berkeley's Idealism, the doctrine that 
what we perceive has no existence apart from someone's perceiving it, 
that there are no things in the world capable of existence.independent 
of being perceived. A second theory is a Representative or Causal 
Theory, usually associated with John Locke,.and a form of which Beloff 
espouses. This theory is based on the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities of an object, the primary ones typically being 
identified with size, shape, solidity, number, etc., and causing in the 
human observer the secondary qualities, colors, odors, tastes, etc. 
The primary qualities are held to be in reality as they appear to be, 
while the secondary qualities are merely the effects of powers resident 
in objects by virtue of their primary qualities and have no resembling 
qualities correspondi.ng to them in the physical object. · And finally, 
the third theory of perception considered by Beloff is what is known 
as Direct Realism, or sometimes Naive Realism. This being the view 
that material things are just as they appear to be in size, shape, 
color, and so forth. It further holds that physical things continue 
to exist while not being observed and are exactly as they are when 
observed. Beloff identifies this view chiefly with the Linguistic 
Analysts'; especially Gilbert Ryle. He also refers to this view as 
the commonsense view. Beloff's approach is to eliminate Idealism on 
the basis that it has no active supporters today and hence there is 
nothing to gain in discussing it. In other words, it is not really 
considered a "live option" for contemporary philosophers. He then 
limits his discussion to a debate between Direct Realism and a Repre-
sentative Theory. His.arguments take a negative approach in that he 
attempts to show that Direct Realism fails to conform to certain per-
ceptual facts and this leaves us with no choice but to make the best 
of the Causal approach to perception. He advances his own form of a 
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Representative Theory, which he modestly claims is among the "least un-
satisfactory." (p. 59) His arguments against Direct Realism are not 
new, but he .does apply his own twist to them. They are the argument 
from the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of an ob-
ject, from the finite velocity of light, from science, from illusion, 
and from the relativity of perception. 
My thesis is threefold: (1) None of the above al;'guments constitute 
valid objections to Direct Realism or good grounds for necessitating 
acceptance of a Representative Theory of perception; (2) Beloff's theory 
of perception suffers from inherent difficulties which preclude it from 
being among the least unsatisfactory; (3) Beloff's apprbach to 
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perception is misdirected in that he takes an object analysis approach 
to perceptual statements in his· a.rguments .against Direct Realism and in 
his opening question about perception when we in fact do not ordinarily 
perceive objects. 
I suppose that it could be said that I am defendi.ng Direct Realism 
in this paper. Many opponents of this idea have criticized those of us 
who support it for not spelli.ng out clearly and with some elaboration 
just what the basic beliefs of this theory are. It seems to me that 
the explanation for this is simple; Direct Realism is best understood, 
not as a positive construction of what perception involves, but as a 
denial that any other view of perception than the common sense view 
that we see material objects as they really are is plausible. It is a 
denial that perception requires mediating entities, mental or otherwise. 
It surely is the consensus that perception is a direct, non-mediated, 
process and this strikes me as a prima facie case for this bei.ng so. 
Therefore, the burden of proof that perception is some other kind of 
thi.ng lies with those who claim that it is. Hence, Direct Realism is 
a defense and not an offense. Normally theories are not created unless 
there is a need. Some otherwise unexplainable phenomena are observed 
and a theory is created. This is the position of those who hold Repre-
sentative theories, they observe certain phenomena, such as illusions, 
and argue that.these are incompatible with the commonsense view and pro-
ceed to create a theory to explain such phenomena. I, in defendi.ng 
Direct Realism, s·imply deny that such phenomena are incompatible with 
the commonsense view and simultaneously deny the need of any theory of 
exp laini.ng them. 
Perhaps part of what I am attempting in this work can be explained 
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by this passage from the Philosophical Investigations. "Philosophy 
simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces any-
thing. - Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. 
For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. 116 What I am 
trying to show in this paper is that if we get clear on the concept of 
perception we will find everything lying open to us, no hidden mysteries 
which need be accounted for in terms of mediating entities and no reason 
to advance a theory on the matter. Beloff himself is not completely 
satisfied with his conclusion for a Representative Theory as he says: 
"In electing to defend a Representative Theory I am not oblivious to 
its serious defects; other things being equal I would always prefer a 
theory more consonant with commonsense beliefs ... " (p. 61). Perhaps 
then it could be said that I am trying to relieve him of his unhappy 
conclusion by demonstrating that no such "concession to logic," as he 
calls it, is necessary. 
This paper assumes the fallowing format. Chapters II and I II deal 
mainly with Beloff's five previously mentioned arguments against Direct 
Realism with some criticisms offered on his theory in Chapter II. 
Chapter IV is devoted entirely to criticism of the partic1,tlar form of 
the Representative Theory Beloff defends with an eye to showing that if 
it were true we could not escape Solipsism, and it therefore cannot be 
among the least unsatisfactory theories. In Chapter V, I attempt to 
lay some of the facts of the concept of perception open to view in order 
to avoid the conceptual problems, which I shall point out along the way, 
of postulating mental entities, I also attempt to show that Beloff's 
general approach to perception is misdirected and therefore misleads 
him to suppose the need for mental entities to play the role of objects 
where no objects are necessary. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Robert J. Swartz, Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, (New York, 
1965), p. xi. 
2oon Locke, Perception and ~ Knowledge of the External World, 
(New York, 1967), p. 13. 
3G. J. Warnock, 11Seeing, 11 Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, ed. 
R. J. Swartz, (New York, 1965), p. '49. 
4oon Locke, Perception and~ Knowledge £f. the External World, 
(New York, 1967), p. 15. 
5John Beloff, The Existence of Mind, (New York, 1964), p. 11. 
All subsequent quotations from Beloff are taken from this work and will 
therefore simply be followed by their page numbers. 
6Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (New York, 
1958), p. 50. . 
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CHAPTER II 
A REPRESENTATIVE THEORY AND THE EXIGENCIES OF SCIENCE 
John Beloff's Theory of Perception 
Professor Beloff opens his exposition on perception with this 
question: "When we look around or listen to what is going on, what 
actually is it that we perceive?'' (p. 56) His answer embodies a 
Representative Theory of perception which precludes physical objects 
as a correct answer to this question. My aim in this chapter is to ex-
plain his theory as I understand it and then to consider in a critical 
light three of the basic reasons he uses to show why physical objects 
cannot be the immediate objects of our perceptions. These reasons are 
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the finite 
velocity of light and modern physiological discoveries. But first a 
presentation of his theory is needed. 
Beloff states his theory like this: 
Perception is a process comprising at least two constituents: 
a public physical object and private mental entity or percept. 
This percept comes into being at the end of a long and very 
devious causal chain having its origin in the physical object. 
The two stand in a unique relationship which, for want of any 
more accurate expression, might be described by saying that 
the former represents the latter. (p. 59) · 
Realizing these terms need further refinement and clarification Beloff 
offers further explanation and in addition adds one more concept, the 
phenomenal object. He explains that one thing the Representative Theory 
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teaches is that to understand perception we need to disti.nguish between 
the followi.ng three elements: 
The physical object, the percept and the phenomenal object. 
This last is a psychologi~al reality but it has no ontolog-
ical status. It gives coherence to what would otherwise be 
a series of disfointed percepts and, for commonsense, it 
might be regarded as a necessity of belief. Neither the 
p'ercept no'r the physical object, on the other hand, play 
any part in commonsense experience but neither are they 
'mythical entities;' they are; one might say, theoretical 
entities whose existence.the philosopher, reflecting on 
the natl.Ire of perception from above, as it were, postulates 
as a necessity of ~ught. (p. 71) 
I take this necessity of belief invol vi.ng a psychol.ogical reality to 
mean this. The objects we normally perceive seem to us to be real 
existents in the external world, physical or material objects, with 
what philosophers might call ontological status. We cannot help be-
lieving that what we.perceive exists in the world before us just as it 
appears, without such a belief our experience would seem.incoherent. 
But upon investigation, such as the one Beloff conducts in his book, 
which shall be reviewed in the latter part of this chapter, we realize 
that our normal perceptions cannot have the ontol_ogical status we sup-
posed them to have. We are thus forced by the necessity of thought, 
our reasonings, to postulate the percept which represents the physical 
object, and the physical object. That which we are directly aware of 
in sense experience is a phenomenal object, while the physical object 
is known only by description. The percept is a mental representation 
of the physical object and mediates our acquaintance with phenomena. 
This·is essentially the Russellian distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description. 1 
Beloff provides an illustration which shows how the distinction 
between phenomenal and physical objects is to be made. 
A simple illustration should suffice to make this distinc-
tion clear. A familiar way of ascertaining the weight of 
an object is to place it on a spring-balance and take a 
reading from a calibrated dial. In this operation the 
critical item of sense-experience is the pointer-reading 
but, since the resulting measurement would have been the 
same if instead of a spring-balance we had used a pair of 
scales, the sense-experience is clearly a subordinate ele-
ment in the operation. If we compare this with a judgment 
of heaviness we see at once the difference, for now it is 
the immediate impression which the object produces on the 
observer that cnunts, not its effect on some other object 
such as a weighing machine. It is the sense-experience as 
such that is now the prime element of the operation. 
(pp. 71- 72) 
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So the distinction between phenomenal and physical object or prop-
erty is this: if the property can be known directly it is phenomenal, 
if it can only be known indirectly or inferentially, then it must be a 
physical property. Returning to the illustration, we observe the scale 
reading to find an object's weight, and this weight, however many pounds 
and ounces, is a physical property of the object. But if we pick the 
thing up to make a -Ju.dgment of its heaviness, this heaviness is the 
phenomenal property. Beloff must be thinking something like this. If 
we weigh an object no matter what the device used, so long as all de-
vices are based on identical standards and so long as we have the same 
conditions of gravitational pull, etc., the weight will always be the 
same no matter who does the weighing. Say we have an object which 
weighs three pounds, this can be detected by many different kinds of 
weighing machines. But when a person picks this object up he does not 
immediately perceive the object's weight, the three pounds, he perceives 
its heaviness. Thus a three pound thing may feel heavy to a child and 
light to an adult, but it still is a three pound object. The weight 
is only perceivable via some device, while the heaviness is immediately 
perceivable to anyone. This precise weight then is the physical 
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property and is known by description, three pounds, which is the cause 
of the phenomenal property, h.eaviness, which can be known by acqmiint-
ance. 
The reader will notice a switch in the discussion from physical 
and phenomenal objects to physical and phenomenal qualities or proper-
ties. However, on Beloff's view this does not actually constitute a 
switch in referents. When we observe properties of various objects, 
such as their redness, roundness, sweetness, etc., we think of these as 
qualities and not as objects. According to Beioff they do represent 
qualities of objects, but they are also phenomenal objects, that is, 
objects of our sense experience and not literally qualities of objects. 
Their existence is mental in status while real qualities are physical. 
The phenomenal properties, or objects, are then properties in the.sense 
that they represent what we call' qualities of physical objects. They 
are objects in the sense that they are the objects of our sense exper-
ience; and they are a "necessity of belief" in that we .believe tq.em to 
be physical objects before we give the matter thought. 
Beloff further distinguishes between two kinds of phenomenal prop-
erties, as he says: 
We begin by stating as a postulate of the theory that otir 
percepts represent for us the external world. We then dis-
tinguished between-two types of representation: a primary 
one where there was a map-like correspondence between the 
phenomenal property of the percept and the physical property 
of the external object (properties of size and shape, etc.,. 
fell into this category) and a secondary one where there was 
no logical resemblance but merely a code.,.like correspondence 
between the two (the sensory qualities of colour, odour, 
sound, etc., fell into this category). Both of these cate-
gories however could be lumped together as dealing with the 
·. descriptive attributes of the phenomenal object.· (p. 81) 
Thisdistinction is essentially the Galilean distinction between pri-
mary. and secondary.qualities which was. given its classic exposition by 
John Locke. Locke distinguished between three sorts of qualities. 
First, there are in objects those qualities which are in them whether 
we perceive them or not, bulk, figure, number, motion and so forth. 
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We have via these an idea of the thi_ng as it is. in· its elf. An idea of 
these on Locke's view is an idea of primary qualities; and what we 
might call on Beloff's view primary phenomenal properties -of a percept. 
Secondly, there is the power that is in any body, on account of its 
insensible primary qualities, to cause in a person different ideas of 
colors, sounds, tastes, etc. These are called sensible qualities or 
secondary qualities. On Beloff's view we might call them secondary 
phenomenal properties of a percept. Thirdly, there is in any body, due 
to the particular constitution of its primary qualities, the power to 
make a cha:nge in bulk, f_igure, texture, motion, etc., of another body 
so as to cause.us to see it differently than previously. This sort of 
power is the power the sun has to make wax white or that fire has to 
make lead liquid. I understand by Beloff's term "physical object" 
these powers plus the insensible primary qualities. 
Thus Beloff has explained two kinds of representation. Real and 
insensible primary qualities of an object produce in us percepts with 
phenomenal properties which bear a logical resemblance to the physical 
object itself. He calls this an "iconic or map ... 1ike11 representation 
and considers visual space an example of such a representation. Then 
there is another kind of representation of a physical object, this is 
the kind revealed to us by our sense-modalities and bears no resemblance 
to the physical object. Beloff names this representation "non-iconic 
or code-like . 11 The relation which exists between a smell and an odor-
ific substance is an example of this representation. That is, there is 
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no resemblance between a smell and the molecules of the substance pro-
duci.ng the smell in us, the molecules constituti.ng the physical corre-
late to the phenomenal object, the smell. 
I think it would now be fair for us to conclude that Beloff is 
usi.ng "percept" as a genus word to include two species of representa-
tion which are produced by primary qualities. Hence, there is a pri-
mary.representation and a secondary representation. He does hold that 
the percept, a private mental entity, is an extended thi.ng, an event 
in time with ontological status, while the phenomenal object lacks such 
ontol_ogical status as a psychol.ogical reality. I simply assume this to 
~ean that the two phenomenal representations are not physical proper-
ties as we normally suppose what we sense to bej they are rather as-
pects of a percept which has mental status. and:. is like a physical ob-
ject with respect to primary qualities, but unlike a physical object 
with respect to secondary qualities. The phenomenal object and the. 
percept are like two sides of the same thing. Looked at one way, 
phenomenally it has no existence; looked at another, mentally, it has 
existence. One may think we can conclude from this that the percept 
is the object of our perception and that the answer to Beloff's orig-
inal question, "When we look around what do we actually perceive?" , 
is that we perceive percepts. But this would be incorrect according 
to Beloff. He explains (p. 60) that to talk of perceivi.ng one's per-
cepts is strictly improper as is remembering one's memories. He fur-
·ther wishes to restrict the. term "perception" to mean "veridical per-
ception." Thus to speak of perceiving a tree will imply that there is 
a tree to be perceived. Then whether we shall need to introduce some 
technical terms like "sensing" or "intuiting'i one's percepts wi 11 . . 
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depend on other epistemological considerations. Actually though, Beloff 
never clarifies this point any further and this must become one point 
of criticism in what follows. 
The reader will recall two sorts of necessities spoken of, one 
psychol_ogical, ·which has already been defined, the other logical, a 
necessity of thought. This latter necessity imposes upon us the Repre-
sentative Theory of perception and is identical with the "exigencies 
of science." These exigencies are, as briefly mentioned earlier, 
Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary properties of an 
object, which leads to his phenomenal-physical distinction, the discov-
ery that light travels with finite velocity, and recent discoveries in 
scientific neuro-physiol_ogy. These three factors are used by Beloff 
to show that immediate awareness of objects is not possible and that a 
Representative Theory of perception is required to be consistent with 
all ou:r knowledge. It is my contention that the first two of these 
involve misunderstandi_ngs. as to their relationship with perception 
which releases us from Beloff' s necessity of tho_ught (the Representa-
tive Theory) and that the third factor is irrelevant to any such theory 
of perception. So it is these three factors in turn which I propose 
to treat in the following sections. 
The Argument from Primary and Secondary Properties 
Our first concern then is with the clarity and usefulness of the 
distinction between priwary and secondary properties of objects, in the 
la_ngu_age of Beloff the distinction between two kinds of representation 
of t}J.e physical object. I must confess difficulty in tryi_ng to ex-. 
plain the basis upon which this distinction is founded and in defending 
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its usefulness, for I do not find Beloff con$istent in all phases of its 
employment. He grants, as we have seen, the validity of the Berkeleian 
criticism of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary quali-
ties; hence, that Locke's ideas of primary qualities upon examination 
come to be every bit as mind dependent as his ideas of secondary quali-
ties. That is, that our knowledge of primary qualities is knowledge 
of ideas which represent the qualities of the object and not direct 
knowledge of the objects. Berkeley used this as grounds for the con-
clusion that there are only ideas and no physical objects, but Beloff 
does not. He claims that the important distinction is between powers 
of a body which it possesses due to "its insensible primary qualities" 
and the ideas of these powers which arise in the mind, whether primary 
or secondary. This he says is the Galilean distinction and the criti-
cal one for any Representative Theory. (p. 73) But surely it makes 
no difference if one holds that what we are aware of represents a 
power, or co;rresponds to an object in an iconic fashion. As long as 
one admits that we are only aware of the representation and never of 
the thing represented how are we to verify that our representation is 
or is not an accurate one? Beloff holds that we are aware of the pri-
mary qualities of a physical object by description, a description 
based on the primary qualities of the percept. But what basis have we 
for asserting this description is more accurate than one based on 
secondary qualities of a percept, which Beloff holds with Locke and 
others, is not accurate? That is, secondary qualities only correspond 
to some real power and do not resemble it. Perhaps an illustration 
will help to make this point clear. 
As the reader may recall, Beloff explains that the importance 
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this distinction between primary and secondary qualities has for his 
Representative Theory is that there must be t.wo kinds of representa-
tion in the world. A primary one existing between physical properties 
of an object and the percept, an iconic or map-like representation, 
while the other, a secondary one, existing between physical proper-
ties of an object and the percept, a non-iconic or code-like repre-
sentation. An example of the former relationship is that which exists 
between physical space and visual space, this relation being one of 
isomorphism; and it is on account of an iconic like correspondence be-
tween the two that we are able to know approximately how objects are 
situated in the external world. Hence, this particular relation exists 
between the physical world and the private mental entity each of us 
have, a percept. But how on such a view as the present one can we dis-
tinguish between visual space and physical space, between what the per-
cept, the physical worlds representative, and the physical object re-
veal to us, since the physical world is never revealed to us? On this 
view would not asking if the percept resembles the physical object be 
analogous to asking of someone who has recently seen a movie based on 
a novel, but not read the novel, if the movie resembled the novel? 
Now concerning the second kind of representation that exists in 
the world, the non-iconic or code like representation. This exists 
between physical properties of an object and secondary phenomenal 
properties of a percept, the former being the cause of the latter. 
Examples of these are smell and color perception. Here Beloff points 
out there is rto logical resemblance between an odor and the molecules 
or molecular structure of the odorific substance. By logical resem-
blance he must mean that there is no necessary resemblance in that a 
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smell does not have to resemble the thing of which it is the odor. He 
further points out in the case of color perception that the hue, the 
phenomenal aspect of light, has no resemblance to its physical corre-
late, light wave-length. By resemblance he means that there is nothing 
in.a physical object which, if we could directly sense a physical ob-
ject, would look like what we "see" when we see a color or smell like 
what we smell when we smell an odor. There resides in physical objects 
only.physical properties or powers which cause us to see colors and 
smell odors, these colors and odors are nothing in the object them,.. 
selves. In the case of smell I am somewhat baffled as to what to make 
of his point. I. am tempted to say something like this; . "I did not 
realize a smell was supposed to resemble the object." A smell does 
not resemble a look granted, but what is this supposed to prove? 
It is obvious that Beloff is referring to molecular structure 
as the physical cause of an odor and light waves as the physical 
cause of a hue. Here.then I should like to point out that we have 
previously been provided with a criterion for the distinction between 
physical and phenomenal objects, viz., that physical objects are dis-
covered inferentially and phenomenal objects directly. But the dis-
covery of the physical objects in question, light waves and molecular 
structure, was not a discovery from an inference based on phenomenal 
representation. Light waves were discovered by an analysis of light 
itself not by an inference frqm the hue to its light wave-length. If 
we conduct the experiment of letting a beam of sunlight pass through 
a prism we will observe a dispersion of the beam into its composite 
colors. 2 But we are not.here so much inferring that light waves do 
this as we are seeing that they do. And neither was molecular 
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structure discovered from an inference fro·m the. phenomenal representa-
tion of smell. So it is the case that the present physical objects 
Beloff refers to will not even pass his own criterion of a physical 
object. 
A further objection to construing the physical object correspond-
ing to hue as light waves is this. It has been discovered that each 
specific wave-length corresponds to a specific hue, for example, a 
wave-length of 575 millimicrons is a yellow wave-length. But the con-
verse of this is not always the case; that is, a yellow hue is not al-
ways the production of a wave-:le.ngth of 575 millimicrons. There are an 
indefinite member of wave-lengths which will produce a yellow hue. 
(p. 75) Now thewave-lengths.are thought of as physical objects and 
the hue as phenomenal, and Beloff holds that physical objects have. 
ontol.ogical status while .the phenomenal objects possess merely psycho-
1.ogical status, so here we are faced with the peculiar consequence of 
having psychological objects, hues, being more stable than their cor-
respondi_ng physical objects, wave-lengths. 
A final objection to this account of phenomenal objects as hues 
and physical objects as wave-lengths is this. The proposition associ-
ating wave-lengths causally with colors is purely a contingent proposi-
tion not a necessary one. Hence, we could very well imagine one with-
out the other, in fact, there are wave-lengths, such as infrared, which 
have no associative hue to the unaided human eye. And a man born blind 
could understand what a wav,e-:length is, but he could hardly understand 
what the color yellow is. This means he would not have.the concept of 
color ordinary people have. That is, he could explain to someone the 
theory of light-waves yet he could never identify the color yellow. 3 
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Then if this is true there need.not .be an inference from the phenomenal 
object, hue, to the physical object wave-length. And further, Beloff 
has not yet made clear the distinction between these two kinds of ob-
jects in concrete understandable terms and hence-this distinction can-
not be_ grounds for necessitating a Representative Theory of perception. 
It may be·objected by some that I am depending too much on an 
illustration of a theory and not really criticizing the.substance of 
the theory itself, This might be a valid objection in cases where 
theories are clearly explained apart from examples and illustrations of 
them, but Beloff's theory is not such a case, And remember too, that 
in this section I am criticizing the usefulness and clarity of the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary qualities for a Representative 
Theory of perception, and this distinction, being one between qualities, 
could· hardly be made apart from illustrations. This distinction is 
aUeged to describe our world of perception and if one who advances 
this distinction in support of a theory cannot provide clear and con-
sistent examples of how such a distinction fits into that theory, then 
this is surely grounds for rejecting the usefulness of such a distinc-
tion for that theory. This is my position in regard to the primary-
secondary quality distinction for Beloff's theory. 
One final point in this section. If we recall the question Beloff 
is attempting to answer, viz., "what·is it that we see when we look 
around?", what must his answer now be? The· answer has got to be that 
we do not see anything. We cannot see physical objects, as they are 
identified with insensible qualities. We cannot see percepts since he 
has ruled out perceiving a percept. A phenomenal object is some sort of 
an immediate awareness which he has not described; hence we· ;Fannot on 
this v±;ew see anything. No room has been left for any l_egi timate use 
of the term "see." 
The Argument from the Finite Velocity of-Light 
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The second demand of science that Beloff claims necessitates our 
rejection of the idea that we.can immediately perceive objects and re-
quires that we accept a Representative Theory of perception is the dis-
covery that the velocity of light is finite. He explains the force of 
such a discovery by an example. Suppose, he says, it is a starry night 
and we look up at the sky; "one fact at least is certain: there are a 
very large number of bright specks.contemporaneously present in our 
field of view." He explains that we accept from astronomers.that 
these "bright specks" represent stars which are different d_egrees of 
remoteness form Earth. But on account_of the finite velocity of light 
we shall either have to deny that these "bright specks" are contempo-
raneously prese:pt, in which case we would be denying the evidence of 
our senses, or admit that these specks are visual representations of 
physical objects, stars. (p. 68) 
I should first like to call attention to the question begging 
phrases Beloff employs in describing our observing these stars; phrases 
such as "bright specks" and ''represent stars .. " The question at hand 
is whether or not there ;ire grounds for saying {hat what we see in the 
night sky are stars or some form of a starlike thing, a representative, 
so we ought not b_egin by assuming there exist grounds for the latter. 
In the preceding section it was shown that on Beloff's theory we 
do not see anything, hence it·must follow that we do not see stars 
either. And one of the reasons is that the velocity of light is finite. 
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What Beloff thinks this implies is that the star and what we see are 
not contemporaneous, that is, they are not simultaneous events. It 
works something like this. For convenience sake consider a case of a 
person's seeing the sun, a medium size proximate star. Science has un-
covered a time lapse between the time light is emitted from the sun 
and the time the light strikes an observer's eye on Earth, a time lapse 
of approximately eight minutes. Now the argument is that since there 
is this eight minute time. gap between the light's leaving the sun and 
its striking an observer's eye there is no possibility of seeing the 
real sun because how can you see now an event which took place eight 
minutes ago? Thus we must see something else, some kind of a repre-
sentative, as it were. 
There are three comments I should like to make concerning this 
matter. First, might I remind the reader of Beloff's criterion for an 
object's being phenomenal. It is that we are directly aware of such 
an object, that it makes an immediate impression upon the observer. 
He even provides us with an example, a judgment that a thing is heavy, 
or a judgment of heaviness by feeUng, holding, etc. But is it not 
obvious that if the finite velocity of light is valid grounds for re-
jecting immediate awareness of visual objects that the finite velocity 
of nerve impulses will on the same grounds preclude the possible of 
any such judgment of a phenomenal object. He must either give up his 
criterion of phenomenal objects or his time gap argument for non-
immediate perception of visual objects. Secondly, as long as Beloff 
continues to hold to the perceptual model of physical object causing 
percept or phenomenal object there has got to be a.time gap. There is 
bound up in the concept of cause and effect the idea that the cause 
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must precede its effect, therefore there will always be a time gap be-
tween the occurrence of the physical object and the phenomenal object; 
what follows from this is. that no matter how close we_ get to the sun 
we will never see it. It here means "real sun" or "physical object 
sun." Thirdly, what is this difference between the physical occurrence 
of the sun and the phenomenal occurrence? If we were standing by the 
sun, or on it, if that were possible, we would see the light eight min-
utes prior to an observer on the Earth. Yet this still would not con-
stitute our seeing the physical sun. There is no way to differentiate 
between the physical sun and phenomenal sun except as has been done, 
viz., to say the physical sun causes the phenomenal sun. But this 
cause is of an unusual sort when compared to other causes. When we 
usually speak of causes we can talk about the cause separately from its 
effect, as in the case of the cause of diseases, weather:, and so forth. 
But this physical cause of a phenomenal effect remains entirely unknown 
apart from its effect. We merely are to suppose what we see is an 
effect of a hidden cause due to scientific discoveries, in the present 
case the finite velocity of light. If sunrise is scheduled for six 
o'ciock on any given fuorning should we say the real sunrise occurred at 
eight minutes before six? Then if a game ranger catches us duck hunt-
ing five minutes before six ought we ex.plain to him that the real sun-
rise occurred three minutes ago only we cannot see it as yet. To speak 
of the sunrise is to speak of the time the sun's light first strikes 
earth or the time the sun is first visible from Earth. The discovery 
that the velocity of light is finite is a useful scientific discovery, 
yieldi_ng a standard of measure for extremely large distances (light 
years) and so forth, but I fail to see how it entails the denial of our 
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seeing objects as they are. How does this fact alter our concept of 
sun, star and all perception mediated by light so as to require the 
assumption of a hidden insensible cause of our sensations? 
·. D. M. Armstrong objects to this time gap argument with the follow-
ing analysis. 
In the case of the star it may be questioned whether our 
immediate perception really involves any temporal illusion. 
It may be suggested that what we immediately perceive is 
not the star, but a present happening, causally connected 
with the extinction of the star many years ago. The star 
sends a message to us, as it were, and we immediately per-
ceive the message, not the star. 
To this view, which seems a fair statement of Beloff's, Armstrong asks: 
11What can the immediate objects of sight be?" They cannot be sense 
impressions, percepts or phenomenal objects because we do not perceive 
these. They cannot be light-waves because we do not see light-waves 
either. So the only object we can possibly see in this case is the 
4 star. 
Armstro.ng conclUdes that when we learn of the contingent facts in-
volved in perception, the velocity of light, our reaction time, and so 
forth our conceptual system is shocked; shocked because our ordinary 
concept supposes that we perceive bodies contemporaneously present, but 
this new knowle.dge seems to suggest that this is not possible. Thus 
conceptual revision is necessary. Since we cannot perceive now what 
took place sometime ago, what existed in the past, we must perceive 
something else which is contemporaneously present; hence, a percept. 
Notwithstanding Beloff denies we perceive percepts, on his view we 
just have them. But when we look at the stars with this new knowledge 
they look the same, that is they look as though we are immediately per-
ceiving them and we fail consciously to notice any mediating mechanism. 5 
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The problem seems to be a conceptual one. The scientist does not use 
the word "star" differently from the ordinary person, he simply has 
more information about them. The discoveries of science may alter our 
concept of star in one way. Science may reveal that what we have in 
the past been referring to as a star is really a planet, or something 
of this nature. But this only reveals a mistake, not a new entity. 
We can discover stars, peer at them through telescopes, gain informa-
tion about them and their influence on Earth, name them and so forth. 
But these activities do not change our referent from a physical one to 
a mental one. The fact that the velocity of light is finite and that 
light mediates visual perception does not entail that perception is 
also mediated by a mental entity. 
The percept and phenomenal object were invented to explain how we 
could see a star such as an extinct star, not contemporaneously present. 
But we have seen that this leads to confusion as to what we do per-
ceive. Beloff argues that since the velocity of light is finite we 
must perceive or be aware of something other than what emits the light. 
However, this involves another confusion, it treats one event as two. 
To speak in this manner supposed the happening of the physical object, 
star of whatever, as one µndetectable, unperceivable, and unknowable 
cause of another event, the percept. While it is true we cannot see 
without light, it is not true that all we see is light. Since we do 
not see light in most cases, the argument from the finite velocity of 
light for the existence of percepts is irrelevant, 
The Argument from Science 
The third demand of science which Beloff considers to embody 
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logical proof that we cannot see physical objects and which sheds light 
on what we must see when we look around is the discoveries of scien-
tific neuro-physiology. He refers to what is called the theory of 
"cortical projection" as a landmark discovery in this area. I should 
like to begin thi~ section first by quoting his explanation of this 
theory and what he calls its philosophical implications. He says: 
The crux of the theory is that there is a definite corres-
pondence between the pattern of excitation at the receptors 
and the pattern of excitation in the corresponding sensory 
areas of the cortex. The latter is then said to be the 
cortical projection of the former. This, if we iniagitie 
someone staring fixedly at a triangle, we would have to 
suppose that a roughly triangular configuration of nerve-
cells in the occipital region of that person's brain was 
concurrently in a state of arousal. (p. 58) 
And then he says of this phenomenon and its implications. 
The cortical projection is important, however, inasmuch as 
it represents the last stage at which the original physical 
stimulus is· still formally identifiable. Perhaps the philo-
sophical implications of the theory might best be expressed 
with the help of a picturesque, but not I think misleading, 
illustration if one said that a demon ensconced in the 
skull of a blind man could, by the appropriate manipulations 
of cortical fibers, enable its owner to enjoy the same vis-
ual experiences as those of a sighted companion! (p. 59) 
The first quote then briefly explains a scientific discovery that 
before an individual can see something a chain of physiological pro-
cesses must take place involving many anatomical structures~ namely 
visual receptors, nerves, occipital lobes, cortical projections and 
the like. The second quote embodies the use Mr. Beloff makes of the 
first one in furthering his cause for the Representative Theory of per-
ception. I shall have more to say about both of these in what follows. 
Now recall again the original question which Beloff has asked; 
when we look around what do we actually perceive? or what do we actu-
ally see? In the case of vision, we realize that this is a question 
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about the objects of our perception and not about physiological pro-
cesses. To be relevant to the original question there must be some in-
formation contained in the above quoted theory which implies something 
about the properties of objects we see. But is there? Beloff argues 
that the cortical projection is important in as much as it is the.last 
stage at which the original stimulus is :i,.dentifiable, yet no connection 
is made between this projection and what we see, other than a causal 
connection. He does not contend that this projection is what we see 
nor does he identify it with either a percept or phenomenal object, so 
all it can embody is a necessary, possibly even a sufficient, condition 
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for perception to take place. Thus, this scientific explanation of 
vision makes no assertions about any of the elements Beloff spells out 
in his theory and therefore cannot make any assertions about what we 
perceive. Norean such a theory force changes in our concept of per-
ception if it makes no assertions about the contents of that concept. 
The cortical projection theory is a scientific or physiol.ogical exp la-
nation of perception and not a theory.about perceptual concepts. This 
point will be further developed later in the Chapter, butfor now let 
it suffice to say this. Since this theory is not relevant to ah ex-
planation of the elements of Beloff's theory nor what we see when we 
look around it cannot be of use to him in explicati.ng his Represerita.-
tive Theory, and the only use he might be able to make of it would be 
as the foundation of an~ther attempt to show immediate perception is 
not possible. Thus the argument reduces to one form of what Armstrong 
labels as the argument from causation .against our perceiving physical 
objects, which seems to me to be. guilty of irreparable_weaknesses. 
Armstro.ng. explains the argument this way. First, the most the 
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argument from causation could prove is that the immediate objects of 
perception are states of our brain. (On Beloff's view we are directly 
aware of the phenomenal object. He has ruled out perceiving our per-
cepts and does not make it clear what we perceive). But we normally 
have no perceptual acquaintance with the events which take place inside 
our skull, so the conclusion that these events are the objects of our 
perceptions is unacceptable. And further, if these brain states could 
be perceptual objects we could only speak of having them, since we do 
not see them, and this would create a kind of mystery about what sort 
of perception takes place. (A kind of perception where we do not per-
ceive anything, we only have things). Where the argument has gone 
amiss is in confounding two distinct phenomena, viz., perceiving an X 
with the causal conditions which bring about this perception. It no 
doubt is the case that human perception cannot occur in the absence of 
the brain processes explained in the Theory of Cortical Projection, 
but this can only require that we admit them as necessary conditions 
for perception to occur. What grounds are there for identifying this 
process with perceiving, let alone its objects as the objects of per-
ception. "The stick that beats me makes me jump, but my jumping is 
quite distinct from the sticks hitting me. The beating of light-waves 
on my eyes and brain makes me see, but seeing is not identical with 
the beating of the light-waves. 116 
Returning now to consider what Beloff calls the philosophical 
implications of this scientific theory. His illustration was that of 
a blind man who, by virtue of a demon manipulating the appropriate 
cortical fibers, enjoys the "same" visual experiences as a sighted per-
son. I suppose this illustration is meant to show that a physical 
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object, while implied by the verb "to perceive", is not strictly neces-
sary for a person to see; that one person can "see" the same object as 
another only without the physical object. And since he is "seeing" 
something without a physical object he .must.be "seeing"·a mental one, 
only not a percept since perceiving percepts has previously been ruled 
out. In order for the above argument to have impetus it must continue; 
now in the case of the sighted man the physical object acts as a stimu-
lus for him to see. It stimulated the physiological processes which 
cause him to see. The only difference in the case of the blind man is 
that a demon initiated his physiological processes, but since both men 
see the same thi.ng and the blind man does not see the physical object 
then neither does the s.ighted man see the physical object; and hence 
they must both see some sort of representative. Here we might notice 
that one facet of Beloff's theory, and an important one, comes back to 
haunt him, so to speak. He :Oas in tryi.ng to avoid one conceptual trap 
stepped into another. In saying we cannot perceive a percept he leaves 
us in doubt as to what, on his view, we perceive. What he says of the 
blind man and the sighted man is that they enjoy the same visual experi-
ences. But s.ighted men see things. He must admit we see something 
and perceive something. And he has already told us that to perceive is 
to perceive veridically, that to perceive a tree implies there is a 
tree there to perceive. So it .becomes plain to us that the sighted 
man can correctly be said to perceive something while the blind man 
cannot because there is no object for the blind man to perceive. Per-
haps Beloff is suggesti.ng that we reserve the term "perceive" to imply 
that there is a physical object corresponding to what we are presently 
sensing, and what we are presently sensing is a phenomenal object; only 
29 
we do not see, hear, smel~, taste, or feel these phenomenal objects: 
because all of these activities are species of perception. So the nat-
ure of this "sensing" of what we are directly aware of is left un-
explained. It seems that this problem with Beloff's theory remains a 
thorn in his side, even in his illustrations. But in reality would 
not the example of the demon and the blind man as opposed to the sighted 
man provide us with a paradigm case for disti.nguishi.ng between 1;1. person 
seeing objects, the sighted man, and a person seei.ng represent1;1.tions of 
objects, the blind man? Actually it would be misleading to say here 
even that the blind man sees representations of objects, for it is not 
at all clear just what he would see or if he sees anything. The blind 
man cannot see percepts, nor phenomenal objects, nor can he see the 
cortical projection. There is a serious doubt here that the blind man 
provides an example of seei.ng or perceiving anythi.ng at all. What can 
be the criterion of his seei.ng the same thi.ng as the s.ighted man and 
what is the nature of what he sees? These questions remain unanswered 
and as lo.ng as they do this example remains unclear and cannot provide 
grounds for. rej ecti.ng our seei.ng objects. 
In order to scrutinize this scientific approach to peJ;"cepti.on a 
bit further,consider the objections to it from H. H. Price. His aim in 
the work from which these objections are stated is to examine our expe-
riences of seei.ng and touchi.ng which yield support to our beliefs con-
cerni.ng material thi.ngs and see in what way and to what extent they 
justify our beliefs. This is not precisely the same question Beloff is 
considering, but both questions involve an analysis and explanation of 
the nature of what we see. Hence, what Price says of tpe scientific 
approach to his question will likewise apply to Beloff's. He says of 
this approach: 
It may appear to some people that science, particularly 
physiology, can answer these questions for us. But it 
should already-be clear that this is a mistake. This if 
it be said that when a man sees something, e.g. a tomato, 
light rays emanating from the object impinge upon his 
retina and this st"imulates the optic nerve, which in turn 
causes a change in the optic centres in his brain, which 
causes a change in his mind:. there are two comments to 
be made. 7 · 
The first is that this description of the perceptual process is no 
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doubt true, but not so important as it may seem for purposes of justi-
fying our observations as a source of knowle_dge; in Beloff's case for 
describing the nature of the objects we see. The physiol_ogist has not 
explained how observation justifies beliefs about a tomato, that it is 
spherical, red, etc. All he has done is advance other beliefs about 
retinas, brains, and the physiological mechanism of perception. The 
second comment is that science only professes to describe causes of 
seei_ng and touchi_ng, but the epistemol_ogical q1,1estion--that is, the 
philosophical question about the nature of what we see~-and Beloff's 
q1,1estion, is about the nature of seeing and perceivi_ng. It would be 
the same as to ask what the words "seeing" and "perceiving" mean. 
Beloff is aski_ng if there is something involved in their meaning and 
in what we see that are_ grounds for supposing we. cannot see a physical 
object. The answer to this question must embody a description of the 
things we see, their nature, whereas the answer to the question about 
perception which a physiologist asks embodies only a causal description 
of bodily processes involved in perception. So scientific physiology 
is irrelevant to Beloff's question. An illustration mc;1.y clarify this 
point. Scientific theories do not usually cha_nge our concepts. The 
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discovery that solid objects are compose~ of atoms which are mostly 
space has not altered our concept of solid object, we still talk of 
such objects as being hard and do not treat them differently. Then 
there are scientific discoveries that do alter our concepts, such as 
the discovery that the .Earth is not the center of the universe, that 
is, we no longer speak of the·Earth as being the center of the universe 
or of the sun's revolving around the Earth. But this physiological 
explanation of vision is more like the former case than the latter. 
For it in no way alters what we perceive, it merely gives an explana-
tion of how vision is possible. No one wishes to say we perceive any 
of the anatomical structures involved in this explanation nor the nerve 
impulses that make vision possible. This physiological theory is not 
suggested as a new definition of."perception" nor a new concept, so 
what bearing can it have on Beloff's problem? 
So the importance of what Price has said, besides the fact that 
scientific explanations are irrelevant to Beloff's question, is that 
if Beloff doubts he sees objects and questions the authenticity of 
what he sees, then this doubt cannot be removed by further observation; 
observation being the source of scientific findings. This is so for 
the obvious reason that if the authenticity of our ordinary perceptions 
is questioned then those made in the sphere of science must also be 
suspect. Armstrong states it this way: 
. if we accepted the Representative Theory on basis of 
the argument from causation, we should have to become 
sceptical about the very evidence which was adduced to 
prove the Representative Theory. 8 
This means that if we allow the causal explanation of perception given 
in science to constitute the solution to the question about the nature 
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of what we see, touch, etc., to force our acceptance of the Representa-
tive Theory of perception, the theory itself then would require us to 
be sceptical about the very. grounds for accepti.ng this Representative 
Theory. This would follow from the fact that the Representative Theory 
would cast doubt concerning the very objects we observed in our scien-
tific invest.igation. To accept the Representative Theory on the basis 
of the argument from causation is then self refuti.ng. 
Here then I should like to say more of the Representation-Theory 
in general, that is, some objections which would seem to strike at any 
such theory. W. H. F. Barnes finds several objections to postulati.ng 
such existents as percepts or sense data. First, it seews these en~ 
~: 1 
tities do not always obey the Law of Excludeg Middle. For example, if 
we cont~mplate some object at a distance it may appear blurred and we 
are unable to tell if it is circular or polygonal. A closer inspection 
is necessary to determine the shape of the object. But the percept 
which appeared to us, on the Representational Model, was neither cir-
cular nor non-circular. So these entities are of the sort which do not 
obey the. laws of fogic. Another oddity concerning these existents is 
the f.act that a percept is just what it appears to be, meaning that 
there is no possibility of further discoveries about its nature. This 
is to be contrasted with our ordinary objects such as an apple or a 
squirrel of which we are capable of makjng new discoveries on further 
investigation. We increase our knowledge in most cases either by 
experiment or observation, but in the case of these entities no further 
observations nor experiment is possible. When we have an appearance, 
or representative, of a phone say, we can not.make one observation of 
the percept now and another later and expect to learn something about 
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it for the simple reason that there is no criterion for the later ob-
servation being the same percept. Hence, the conclusion that to know 
one of these things is to know it completely is forced upon us. Barnes 
finds this a strange situation indeed. This idea of criterion leads to 
a third difficulty on the Representative Theory of perception, that 
while observing some object an eye blink occurs, are we to say two per-
cepts are involved or one continuous percept. The life span of these 
peculiar objects seems somewhat indefinite. 9 
Mr. Beloff began by proposing the Representative Theory of percep-. 
tion as the least unsatisfactory among all possible choices and by 
attempting to use scientific discoveries to prove impossible the per-
ception of a physical object. Surely it is clear by now that this 
theory cannot be among the least unsatisfactory and that there is 
nothing entailed by the distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities of an object or in the discoveries of science that makes it 
impossible for us to perceive physical objects. 
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CHAPTER III 
ILLU9ION AND RELATIVITY 
Chapter .II was concerned with three arguments, collectively re,-
ferred to as the 11exigencies of science," which were intended to show 
the impossibility of immediate perception of physical objects and the 
need for a Representative Theory of perception. In this chapter I will 
consider two other arguments which are supposed to support the allega-
tion that Direct Realism is not possible. These arguments are tradi-
tionally known as the argument from illusion and the,argument from the 
relativity of perception. I shall consider the argument from illusion 
first. 
way. 
The Argument from Illusion 
Beloff's version of the argument from illusion is presented this 
Let us suppose that we are looking fixedly at a tree. We 
then press gently with a finger on one eyeball. It goes 
without saying that we are not in consequence suddenly con-
fronted with two trees but how are we to describe what it 
is we now see? Are we to say, to placate Armstrong, that 
on our right we perceive a physical existent whife on our 
left the:r;e is literally nothing at all, it is merely that 
we are possessed with a strong inclination to believe that 
we perceive there a tree? But, as anyone who cares to per-
form this simple demonstration can verify for himself, the 
two halves of the visual field may be phenomenologically 
indistinguishable! (p. 66) · 
Beloff further describes the objects involved in this experiment. He 
tells us that the duplicate image has·a definite position relative to 
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the.rest of the visual field and that it has temporal attributes in 
that it exists just so long as we maintain pressure on the eyeball. 
Also, it can be compared with its fell ow image, hence, . we cannot deny 
that this image exists. He here asks the question why the positioning 
of the eyeball in its socket should make such a difference as it does 
to the ontol.ogy of the situation? 
Now this argument, in order to show what Beloff desires, that 
Direct Realism is not possible, must.show two things. First~ it must 
de~onstrate that in certain exceptional cases, illusory ones like 
. . . 
double vision, what we are directly aware of are. not physical objects 
but some other object, a sense-datum,,percept or phenomenal object. 
And secondly, that the illusory object and the non-illusory object are 
sufficiently alike so that if we are aware of (perceive, sense or what-
ever Beloff may decide) s~me mental thing in the one case we must also 
be aware of some mental thing in the other. Hence; the conc;lusion 
would follow that objects of perception, what we see when we look 
around, are mental in status, not physical. Don Locke sets up the fol-
lowing four statements as a general formulation of what the argument 
from illusion atte~pts to show. This seems like a fair statement of 
what Beloff is tryi.ng to demonstrate with his double vision experiment. 
(1) All the thi.ngs we perceive via a particular sense-modality, vision, 
audition, etc ... are qualitatively alike. (2) "So it seems natural 
and preferable to say that; all things we perceive are of the same 
ontological type." (3) But some of the things we perceive, for example, 
hallucinations, after-:images, duplicate images in double vision, are 
mind-dependent percepts. (4) So it seems natural and preferable to 
say that all the things we perceive are mind-dependent percepts; mental 
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entities. 1 I shall proceed in what fol.lows to deny statements one and 
three which constitutes a denial likewise of two and a refutation of 
the conclusion, statement four, 
Now consider the first of these four statements; in Bel.off's ex-
planation of the illusion of double vision it is the assertion that the 
two halves of the visual field are phenomenol.ogically indisti.nguishable. 
If we note the context in which this a.rgument occurs we wee that Beloff 
is denying Armstrong's assertion that we are never directly aware of 
anythi.ng in perception except physical objects. So this experiment is 
submitted as evidence that we are aware of something else. We can, 
without, unfairness, suppose Beloff wishes to call this something else 
a phenomenal object since in his view this is the only thing of which 
we are directly aware. And we must further suppose that Beloff would 
accept Locke's formulation of the argument from illusion, especially 
that all our perceptions of a particular sense modality are quali ta-
ti veiy alike and we are therefore always aware of phenomenal and not 
physical objects. For if al 1 Beloff means by sayi.ng the two halves of 
the visual field in the double vision experiment are "phenomenologically 
indisti.nguishable" is that the subject in such an experiment cannot 
always tell which 11 object" is the "real" one, then the Direct Realist 
can readily admit this and not simultaneously admit anythi.ng damagi.ng 
to his view. So now we may ask upon what basis the assertion that all 
perceptions via a single sense modality are qualitatively alike rests? 
We shall b.egin by making some distinctions which ought to clarify 
what we are dealing with when we have an experiment such as Bel.off's, 
There are different kinds of "illusory" perceptions or ways in which 
a perception can _"go wrong." First, I can sense something that does 
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not really exist at all, such as what is perceived while under the in-
fluence of LSD or what psychotics sometimes suffer from, hallucinations. 
Then I can sense something that does really exist, but I mistake it 
for something else which does not exist. This would happen if I mis-
took a vine for a snake, a kind of illusion. Thirdly, I may sense 
something which does really exist, but it is objectively different 
from what I take it to be, such as seeing a red tomato as green due to 
color-blindness. And finally, I may sense something that does really 
exist, and I sense it as it is objectively, but I take it to be some-
thing it is not. An example is the Muller-Lyer illusion in which I see 
two lines which are in fact equal, yet I take one to be the longer. 
These distinctions may be somewhat arbitrary and may not be the only 
kinds of divisions that can be made on this subject. 2 But this is no 
real matter, the importance of the~ is that distinctions betwe~n one 
kind of "illusory perceptions" and another do exist. Especially impor-
tant is that illusions are distingu'ishable from hallucinations, in that 
a hallucination is typically peculiar to one individual and no other 
can experience his hallucination; while an illusion is typically public 
in that it can be experienced by anyone who is willing to place himself 
in the proper circumstances. So illusions and hallucinations are two 
kinds of non-veridical perceptions which are not really alike. Also, 
these illusions are usually explainable in terms of some observable 
cause, such as the physical laws of optics, as mirages etc .... 3 
Beloff's double vision fits best into the second cat.egory here and the 
important questions to answer are: first, is the "duplicate image" 
qualitatively indistinguishable from the real tree, for if it is not 
then the argument loses its force; and secondly, are percepts or mental 
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entities of some sort necessary to explain the presence of the "dupli-
cate image." 
Concerni.ng the first question, what can it mean to say this "dup-
licate tree" in Beloff 's experiment is qualitatively the same as the .. 
real or original tree. This is not a method for produci.ng new trees, 
I mean no one supposes we can cut up both of the trees for firewood. 
No one would attempt to climb the duplicate nor pick an apple .off of 
it if it was an apple tree. These are the sorts of thin:gs we do with 
real trees, so if the real tree and the duplicate are qualitatively 
identical why is.it no one supposes we can work with the duplicate as 
we can the real object. In addition, even if it can be shown that in. 
the one case, the double vision experiment, the duplicate. and real ob-
ject are in fact essentially the same, this could not then be general-
ized to all cases of perception, even where non-veridical perceptions 
are·possible, because as was shown earlier not even all non-veridical 
perceptual experiences are identical. 
Austin in considering this same kind of argument for the existence 
of percepts, .agrees that for this argument to have · force it must show 
that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are qualitatively indis-
tinguishable. But he too questions this premise as he points to dis-
similarities between other cases of perceptual delusion than the.one 
Beloff discusses. He argues that if this premise were true then to 
dream of bei.ng presented to the Pope must be qualitatively indistin- . 
guishable from actually being presented to the Pope. But we have a 
phrase in our language, "dream like quality," which is used to char-
acterize some of our waking experiences. If this premise concerning 
the nature of our veridical and non-veridical perceptions were true 
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then this phrase must be meaningless. And consider the case of a man 
who is hit on the head and reports "seeing stars," are we to say the 
stars we see when hit on the head are qualitatively identical with 
stars we see in the sky? Similiarly, to see a green after-image is 
not like seeing a green patch; and looking at a white wall through blue 
spectacles is not like looking at a blue wall, nor is seeing doubly one 
tree like seeing two trees. 4 All these cases cited involve veridical 
and non-veridical perceptions in which the difference is clearly estab-
lishable, and hence, the premise in the argument from illusion concern-
ing the qualitative similarity between veridical and non-veridical per-
ceptions is very dubious. 
Now let us turn our attention to the premise of the argument from 
illusion that says some of the things we see, like the duplicate in 
double vision, are sense dependent and therefore mental·entities. What 
is it that happens in this experiment of pressing on the eye which 
leads one to the.conclusion that there are percepts, or something of 
this nature, involved? When pressure is applied to an eyeball one sees 
double. Where there is one tree there now appear two. There are not 
two trees so what is it there is two of? Beloff's answer is not en-
tirely clear, he speaks of a duplicate image. (p. 6 7) This could be 
taken ta imply that both of the things one is aware of are images, then 
when·we say we see one tree this would mean we are aware of one image. 
But this would certainly be inaccurate for we do not normally see 
images nor are we normally aware of images. I will not take Beloff to 
mean this however, but rather simply to m~an by "duplicate image" that 
the duplicate or illusory tree before us in the double vision exper-
iment is an image of the real tree and phenomenal in its nature. This 
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image exists as long as pressure is maintained and therefore it has 
temporal attributes, which must mean it exists in some sense. But what 
sense? Now to ask "What are there two of?" demands the answer, on 
Beloff's view one tree and one iII1age of a tree. But Beloff is not him-
self satisfied with this answer, and needs to make both the image and 
the tree identical qualitatively. But is not this question itself, 
"What are there two of?" a trick question commi tti_ng the Fallacy of 
Many. Questions~ It assumes that one sees two of. somethi_ng when he in 
fact sees one thi_ng looking double. 5 Whether seeing one thing doubly 
is the .same as seei_ng two things is a question which Beloff treats as 
already answered in the affirmative without considering it. It is 
true that under certain circumstances we do in fact see things doubly, 
but this is not like seeing two things, and some of the differences 
have already been explained. Beloff says the duplicate tree has tem-
poral attributes and must exist in some form, obviously not physical 
tho.ugh. But sayi_ng this thi_ng has temporal attributes is only to say. 
that the illusion exists as lo_ng as pressure is maintained on the eye; 
as lo_ng as the illusion produci_ng factors are maintained. The force 
of calli_ng this examp~e an illusion means that the illusory tree does 
not really exist. Beloff seems to be caught in a l_ogical necessity, 
he thinks that there must be something where the duplicate tree ;is or 
we could not experience the illusion. But when we look to see what is 
there we find only the real tree and nothing else. So the percept is 
invented as a necessity of tho_ught. But all we really know is that we 
experienced an illusion (the illusion exists) and the force of this 
being an illusion is .that the duplicate tree does not exist. It is an 
illusory object. 
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There seems to be some kind of mystery connected with seeing 
double which compels some authors to invent percepts to explain it. 
Perhaps if we remove some of the mystery we can also remove the compul-
sion to have percepts as the object of our perception. This question 
can be answered in one sense, a causal sense, by a scientific physio-
logical explanation. Normal vision in human beings is binocular, this 
means that each eye receives light waves which are focused through the 
lens of the eye and project an image on the retina of the eye. There 
are identical or corresponding points on the retina of the left and 
right eye, call these points a and b respectively. 
If the image of an object falls in the left eye upon point 
a and in the right eye upon b, the object is seen as a 
single object, but if one image falls upon c (a point other 
than a) and the other upon b, the object is seen double; 
band care said to be unidentical or noncorresponding 
points.6 
So the explanation of why double vision is caused by pressure on the 
eyeball is simple, the pressure distorts the shape of the eye causing 
the image focused on the retina of one eye to fall on a noncorrespond-
ing point of the other eye. Double vision is caused then by disturbing 
the natural physiological visual process. Now that there is no mystery 
as to how or why double vision occurs, why would one suppose two ob-
jects to be involved? 
Perhaps a distinction between two different senses of "see" will 
help. There are two senses of "see" to correspond to two "objects" of 
seeing. One sense, the ordinary sense, concerns typical objects of 
conversation, like tables, clocks, trees and so forth. About these ob-
jects we can ask existence questions. When was it made, born, formed 
or whatever? In the case of the tree we can ask when it was planted, 
last pruned and the like. This is the existence use of "see." A 
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second use or sense of "see" is an appearance use, not an existence use. 
The appearance, in this case, last~ only so long as pressure is main-
tained on the eye. To ask the same sorts of questions about the appear-
ance is to confuse the second use with the first. No objects are im-
7 plied by usi.ng "see" in the appearance sense. 
Some have disputed the legitimacy of this distinction. Austin 
argues that there are not two different senses of "see" or "perceive" 
correspondi.ng to the two circumstances. He holds that rather than 
there being two different senses of "see," we simply stretch ordinary 
usage to accommodate such an exceptional ca,se as double vision by say-
ing, "Now I see two trees." He argues .against there being two senses 
with this anal_ogy. "I might say, while visi ti.ng the zo.o, 
'that is a lion,' pointing to one of the animals. I might 
also say, pointing to a photograph in my album, 'that is a 
lion:' Does this show that the .word 'lion' has two senses-
one meaning ~n animal, the other a picture of an animal? 
Plainly not. 
But I should like to point out . that this anal.ogy is not quite approp-
riate for the situation. First of all, the argument is not that there 
are two senses of "tree" as the lion analogy would suggest. Secondly, 
and more importantly, when I tell someone "that is a lion," pointing to 
a picture~ this is not likely to be misunderstood; that is, no one e:x:-
pects the pictured lion to roar as real lions do. iut when I press 
against my eye and exclaim "Now I see two trees!?" this could be and 
has been misunderstood. Beloff and others who use this experiment to 
support their arguments against Direct Realism have taken this state-
ment to imply the.existence of two objects, realizing there exists only 
one tree, physical object, they suppose the existence of a mental ob-
ject to be the other tree. And if they have not reasoned in such a 
44 
manner then what else could lead them to percepts. If they understand 
that to say there are "two trees" in the double vision experiment does. 
not mean there are two of anything then what reason can there be for 
percepts in this case. They have confounded the existence use of "see" 
with the appearance use. 
Now to return to Austin's objection to two uses of "see" I have 
already shown how his analogy with the lion does not fit the case of 
seei.ng. We might further notice that distinctions are not created 
without reasons, and there is no reason to distinguish between two 
senses of ''lion" for no one confuses a pictured lion with a real lion. 
Even in a case of motion pictures no one confuses the pictured lion 
with a real one, that is, no one shoots at them or runs from them, and 
so forth. The·concept "picture" is understood in most cases and there 
is no reason for distinguishing between different senses of lion, as in 
Austin's anafogy. But the concept "illusion" is apparently not always 
understood, for some, Beloff included, have postulated objects, per-
cepts, to occupy a place of an illusory object, the duplicate tree, 
when there is no object there. 
So now having removed the mystery.of why we see double, the phy-
siofogical explanation, and having shown that we do not need an object 
of any sort in cases of illusion to occupy the place of the illusory 
object, since merely by bei.ng an illusion objects are precluded; we 
ought also be free from needing percepts. Even if the causalist could 
show tha~ percepts were n!eded in some illusions he would still need, 
in order to advance his theory, to show that percepts are needed in 
every case of perception, both veridical and non-veridical. But this 
is just what he cannot show and illusions provide no grounds fol;' a 
Representative Theory. 
Tha .. Ar.gum.e.nt._fr.om_Relati:v:ity of Perception 
Now to turn our attention to what Beloff argues is the most 
serious weakness of the Direct Realist's view, relativity of percep-
tions. He says: 
Take a simple example: many.objects appear to us to have a 
single uniform overall colour. But we know that if we had 
been born with eyes whose lenses had a sufficient power of 
magnification these same surfaces would have appeared as 
highly variegated patchworks. 
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Why should we assume that the world is as it looks to homo 
sapiens when it must almost certainly look quite different 
to the insects, birds and octopuses, let alone any hypo-
thetical Martians? (p. 67) · 
There are two forms any argument from relativity may assume. One is an 
argument from the relativity of color perceptions and the other is an 
argument from the relativity of how things may look to different beings. 
I shall begin with an explanation and analysis of the latter. 
Beloff does not provide details to this argument so we are left to 
our own wits to fill them in. Now we may ask, how might the world look 
different to beings other than ourselves, insects, Martians, etc.? I 
think a fair assumption of what Beloff has in mind, and an argument 
which has been advanced by others, 9 is that thi.ngs which look large to 
one sort of being, a mite, wi~l look small to another, an elephant; and 
further, this can be true of soft and hard, swift and slow and so on. 
But a thing cannot be both fast and slow simultaneously, hard and soft, 
large.and small, although it may appear in these ways to different 
individuals. Hence, these different individuals, while perceiving 
these different properties of an object, c1:1.nnot be perceiving the same 
objects or properties, so these properties cannot be real, physical, 
properties, but rather must.be some kind of a mental entity. The 
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problem may. be posed somethi_ng like this: things look different to 
different people in terms of hardness and softness, swiftness and slow-
ness, largeness and smallness, and would look even more so to different 
species of animals and persons from different planets, so what is this 
object really? Soft or hard, etc.? Beloff must believe we need mental 
entities to be the properties of objects whiqh can look large to one 
individual and small to another. 
But what are such qualities as largenes and hardness, slowness and 
swiftness, etc., except relational qualities of objects. This means 
that to talk of an object being large or small is to talk elliptically. 
Presupposed by such a judgment or incorporated in it is some standard 
of largeness or smallness which is left unmentioned, but which must 
exist if our attribution of these qualities is to have meaning. In a 
large number of cases the standard is our own body, for instance, a 
judgment that a man is a fast runner or that an object is too large 
for one man to move. 10 But this does not implythat a fast man could 
outrun a deer or that an elephant could not move what one man cotild not 
move. Likewise lead is a soft metal, but would make a very hard bed. 
The point is that these are relational judgments, each j~d~ment of 
hardness, swiftness, largeness, etc., has a criterion for its attribu-
tion implied by what it is an attribute of and who is making the judg-
ment. Beloff has not realized this and is apparently looki_ng at these 
relational qualities on the same model as other properties, such as 
the. primary qualities. To ascribe some number to a thi_ng, such as 
saying that a person has two arms, is not like saying the person has 
la_rge arms. The number of arms is something the person has and would 
have even without a numbering system or on a different numberi_ng 
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system. That is, we say a person has two arms on a numbering system of 
base ten, if we changed to base one we would merely change the name and 
not the number of arms. The two arms are something the man has. But 
to ascribe a quality such as largeness is not to ascribe something the 
man has, it is to say how the man compares to other men. To say a 
thing is large, small, soft, hard and so forth, is not to. give a 
report on something we perceive but rather it is to say how a thing 
compares to some standard or to other things of its same kind. A 
relational property is not like other properties of an object, color, 
weight, shape; number, etc., it is more like seeing an aspect of some-
thing. That is, seeing a way a thing may be regarded or viewed, and 
we have standards for ascription of these different relations. So it 
seems sufficient to say in the case of relational properties that the 
reason one thing can look both large and small is not because two dif-
ferent objects are being represented via different percepts, but be-
cause there are various standards for ascribing a relational property. 
Here then we need to consider the first argument contained in the 
passage quoted from Beloff, the argument against Direct Realism on the 
grounds that a person, a Martian say, with eyes whose lenses have a 
sufficient power of magnification to make what appears to us to be a 
solid blue surface appear to him as a variegated patchwork of blue. 
The argument being, I take it, that sirtce colors appear differently to 
beings with different visual apparatuses, all the different appearances 
cannot be properties of the physical object. That is, the surface can-
not be both solid blue and a variegated patchwork of blues, so these 
different appearances must.be properties of mental objects, percepts, 
or be phenomenal properties themselves. 
48 
It may cast Hght on such an argument as this if we find out what 
the force of the 11 appears 11 is in the appearance of this blue surface. 
There are two senses of appears which could be used. There is the 
sense, which might most.aptly be described as the 11resemblance sense," 
that we use to say that a thing x looks like or resembles a thi.ng y, 
but,is not that thing. 11The imitation apple appeared to be a real one 
from a distance. 11 Here the speaker knows the apple is not real, he is 
complimenting the imitation, saying it looks real and is therefore a 
good imitation. This resemblance sense could also take the form of 
the speaker not knowi.ng that the x is not a y, but sayi.ng it does 
appear that the x is a y. "From that distance it appeared as tho.ugh 
there had been a traffic accident, but I was not sure." Then there is 
the "judgment sensel' of appears, to say in this sense that x looks like 
or appears y means that the speaker is inclined to think that xis y, 
but_it may not be. The common characteristic of these two is that 
there is essentially a non-commitment on the part of the speaker to 
what a thing really is. That is, a thing may appear a certain way, 
but the speaker doubts that it.is, or a thing may appear a certain way, 
artd the speaker thinks it is that way. But there is a bit of a doubt 
in either case. 11 
Now we might asl< when we would say of ab lue surface that it 
appears to be a vari.egated patchwork, Well, it would be possible for 
us to look at a surface and judge it to be solid blue, then take a 
magnifying lens that wouldmake the surface look to us as it does to 
our hypothetical Martian, here one would be apt to say "now it appears 
to be a variegated patchwork." But in this case it would.be the resem-
blance sense of "appears11 and not the judgment sense that is meant due 
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to the fact that this individual has just surveyed the surface with the 
unaided eye and found that it was solid blue. The person would under-
stand that it is the magnifying lens that makes the surface look or . . . 
appear to be variegated, though it actually is blue. The presence of 
the magnifyi.ng lens would no more change our concept of blue here than 
the knowle.dge that a solid surface consists of tiny atoms spaced apart 
from each other changes our concept of a solid surface. Consider now 
what the Martian would say when he surveyed this surface, he would not 
say it· appears to be a vari.egated patchwork of blues, b4t rather that 
it is a vari.egated patchwork of blues. He would say thl:1-t it "is" 
rather than that it "appears" because he sees things differently from 
Earthli.ngs. So what is involved in color judgments is the same thing 
that is involved in relational ju.dgments, a standard for the ascription 
of color. 
We ascribe color properties to objects. The dispute contained in 
this argument from relativity is whether these colors are real proper-
ties of objects or simply appearances, the aHegation being that they 
are appearances and a physical object cannot appear to be two different 
colors at the same time, so it must be·a phenomenal or mental thing 
that appears. But there is no reason that the physical object cannot 
appear differently to different individuals. In Beloff's example we 
have a surface which we call blue and which a Martian calls a varie-
gated patchwork of blues, What needs to be shown in order for the 
Representative Theory to. gain support is that something is "seen" other 
than the physical object. But there is no more reason why a thing can-
not look different in regard to colors than in regard to largeness and 
smallness if different standards for ascribing such properties exist; 
and if.different conditions and differently constituted sense organs 
are involved. 
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The,question now is what determines which properties are real and 
which appearances? We cannot distinguish real properties from apparent 
ones by the .real ones being those which exist apart from our perceiving 
them because that would entail that we discover what properties a thing 
has without perceiving it. What counts as whether a thing is.a real 
quality of an object must be explained in terms of what is perceived 
under what conditions. The appearance of a thing and what we perceive 
are partly determined by the conditions of observation. These con-
ditions can be explained in terms of "Stand~rd Conditions" and a "Nor-
mal Perceiver," the real color of an object bei_ng defined as the color 
seen by the"Normal Perceiver" under Standard Conditions. 1112 
Such a theory as this enables us to disti_nguish between real 
colors and appa!ent colors. Beloff believes that because it is poss-
ible for there to ex:i,st in the world two stanqards, the Martians and 
ours, there can be no real colors. But on the contrary, apart from 
some standard or criterion the ascription of a color would not be pos-
sible in that we would not know what was meant. Must we say there is 
no real mile because there exist two standards, the land mile and the 
nautical mile, that is, does the presence of the standard for the nau-
tical mile make the land mile only an appearance of a mile m: vice 
versa? Ordinarily .we do not think of standard conditions for colors 
because we are unaware of any standard other than the human one. But 
the arrival of a. Martian would not destroy our standards and make all 
our color judgments appearances. Properly understood then, such a 
relativism provides no_ grounds for the existence of mental entities as 
intermediaries in our perceptions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A CRITERION IS NEEDED 
The aim of this chapter is to show that Beloff's theory cannot 
escape an agnostic view with regard to the judgments of others; and 
further, that such a theory leads to unintelligibility with r._egard to 
perceptual claims. I offer a criticism of this theory based on dif-
ficulty with criteria for color words which preclude it from being 
among the least unsatisfactory of theories. 
It has previously been noted, in -Chapter II, that Beloff admits 
both primary and secondary qualities to be equally mind dependent; 
therefore we have no justifications for assertions concerning the prop-
erties of physical objects other than by some inference. This could 
lead to solipsism, a kind of skepticism with regard to the real nature 
of physical objects and how we are to understand the statements of 
others, sil!ce we each have our own mental representation of the physi-
cal world. Beloff recognizes this difficulty as he·says: 
Perhaps the hoariest of conundrums in the philosophy of per-
ception is how one observer can tell that he is perceivi_ng 
the same color as another observer. Those who argue against 
the yiew we have taken here that colors, strictly spe.aking., 
are•mental entities, sometimes evoke this conundrum in order 
to show that, on our vtew, we would have to profess com-
plete agnosticism about the fundamentals of each other's 
sense--experience. . . . Admittedly no evidence can be. con-
clusive in the nature of the case, and so it will always 
remain logically possible that what I see as red you may 
call 'red' but.see as green, nevertheless there are, I 
suggest, at least two sound inductive reasons for believ-
ing that our colour-perceptions are in fact.interchange-. 
able~ (p. 79) · 
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This statement is in reference to color perception, but it will 
apply to all perceptions since they are all mind dependent. It is also 
obvious here that what he is calling 11red11 is some kind of private 
mental entity, so he advances two arguments to .show that we all 
probably see the same color when we see the color red. The problem is 
how I am to understand another person when he says a thing is red. We 
need both a criterion for establishing when a thing is red, and on this 
representative view, a criterion for knowing what another means when 
he calls a thi.ng red. Belof.f ignores this first point, and I shall 
return to it later, but now, consider how it is I am able to understand 
another's color judgments. 
First, he argues, if memory is admitted as evidence then we know 
that color perceptions are very stable over the life-cycle of an 
individual. This seems to indicate that color perceptions depend only 
on the nature of the nervous system and the quality of illumination. 
We accept as a biological principle that the more basic the physiologi-
cal function the more likely it is to be universal over an entire 
species. So probably we all see the same colors, or very nearly so. 
This is essentially an argument from analogy, I see a color via my 
physiological processes, such processes, are similar thro.ughout the 
entire species, so probably all humans see identical colors. The 
second a.rgument is that since all observers report color changes in 
similar places along the color-continuum, probably they all see the 
same colors. (p. 80) 
The first argument involves two steps. First, I know what I mean 
when I say a thi.ng is red because I remember what red is. And then, 
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secondly, I know that another means by red what I mean because of the 
anal_ogous structure of our visual equipment. 
First, can memory serve as our criterion for a thing being red, 
which it must do if I am to know on Beloff's view what "red" means. 
To be a criterion memory would need to be infallible. Some may object 
that a criterion need not be infallible and therefore even if memory 
is not infallible it can still serve as our criterion for the color of 
private mental entities. But how could a criterion be fallible? Does 
it make sense to say of a thing that it .meets our criterion for bei_ng 
red, .but it may not be? If this does make sense then having a cri-
terion means no more than having evidence for something and the concept 
becomes superfluous. When we set up a criterion for a thing's being x, 
then when x meets our c:riterion we say we know this thing is an x. For 
example: Suppose that we set up as the criterion for genius the capac-
ity to score above fifty on a given test. Then it will suffice to say 
we know that a particular individual is a genius because he has scored 
above fifty on our test. This explanation is sufficient because to 
say that whoever scores over fifty on this test is a genius is to 
utter "a tautol_ogy. 111 . The way this term "criterion" is employed sug-
gests that knowledge is bound up in the concept of criterion, and 
surely no one denies that infallibility is bound up in the concept of 
knowledge. 
Now to return to our problem. Can memory serve as a criterion 
for color concepts in a private world of percepts. Consider the fol-
lowi_ng experiment. 
We have a man, noted for his integrity, who reports having 
extremely vivid imagery. His imagery is so vivid, he tells 
us, that he can generally read o.ff from it all sorts of 
facts about objects he has recently seen. We present him 
with thefollowing letter-square, and let him scrutinize 
it for a.few seconds: 
em f 
r z a 
O W p 
We then take the square away and ask him whether he has a 
clear image ot it. He says that he does. We then ask him 
to read off the letters from left to right, starting from 
the top and working down. He does so, and makes no mis-
takes. We then ask him to read them off in the opposite 
direction, Suppose that, contrary to his likely behavior, 
he reads them off without hesitation, though he makes 
several mistakes. We have him do the same thing again-
that is, read off the letters in both directions - and 
he gives the same answers. Without mentioning his error, 
we then ask him whether his image changed during the 
experiment. He says, 'No; it remained the same through-
out the experiment, vivid and sharp.' In fact, he em-
phatically endorses all of the following claims, not 
even considering, so great is his confidence, that they 
might not be entirely consistent: 
1. The image did not change during the experiment. 
2. . From left to right, t'op to bottom, the letters . 
were : e , . m, f, r, z , a, o , w, p . 
3. From right to left, bottom to top, the letters 
were p, w, o, r, a, s, f, m, e. (He was evi-
dently wrong about the italicized letters.)2 
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The point here is that the subject had no way to check his memory, he 
was wrong, but absolutely sure that he was right. if it were not for 
the fact that others could correct him, his mistake wouid not ha.Ve beert 
discovered. But others cannot correct me or my color judgments because 
I am the only one who is aware of the colors I am talking about. 
Others could tell me that most people do not _agree with my judgment 
about a color, but this would not make me wrong, only unpopular. The 
fact is that memories are not infallible and cannot serve as a criter-
ion for color judgments which are private. We may here, as a conclud-
ing thought, wonder if there may not be some source other than memory. 
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that can serve as our criterion in this private world. But we immedi-
ately realize that whatever source we may conceive, intuition or what-
ever, ultimately the criterion has got to depend on memory. This is 
the.case because regardless of the standard we chose to rely on.we must. 
be able to remember it. Memory being fallible, stands in need of a 
check, but this is just what cannot be done in a private world, 
Now consider Beloff's argument that I understand what another 
calls red by what I call red because of our similar physiology. This 
means that the criterion for my seeing the same color as another is 
having the same anatomy. (Beloff does not call this a criterion, he 
says it is a sound inductive reason; but it must.serve as a criterion 
for it is all we have to. go on, However, I reject it both as a. cri-
terion and as sound evidence.) Now what are we to say of color blind 
persons who have similar physiological structures, but who cannot see 
colors? Also, are we to say that before this similarity wasdis-
covered no one understood what another meant when the other made a 
color judgment, one person merely supposed he understood another, but 
as yet he could not because the criterion for his doing so had not been 
discovered? And here too I am reminded of how Wit_tgenstein replied to 
an anal.ogous position in r.egard to pain. If I should say that it is 
only from my own case that I know what "red" means must,! not also say 
tq.e same· of other people. "And how can I generalize from the one case 
so irresponsibly? 113 In other words the assertion that others probably 
see the same thi.ng as I do would be groundless. Beloff brings in the 
fact of similar physiological systems from one individual to another, 
but we might also realize that there are individual differences from 
one organism to another. After all; persons with similar physiological 
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make up have different d.egrees of intelligence, different mechanical 
abilities and so forth, so why should we say we all see the same color, 
assumi.ng seei.ng is a private mental experience. 
Actually the most serious difficulty with this argument is that it 
presupposes that I have a criterion myself for knowing what color a 
thing is. We have seen that Beloff uses·memory.to serve as such a cri-
terion, but memory will not do for the simple reason that it is un-
reliable as a criterion. As we have seen it would be a strange sort of 
criterion that is fallible and uncheckable. R. Rhees states the prob-
lem like this. 
It is a question of whether I can have a private under-
standing: whether I can understand something which could 
not be· said in a language anyone else could understand. 
('He may understand· th'e language I speak, but he will 
not understand what I underst'and. 1 ) 4 
So the question is: "Could a person himself, if the Representative 
Theory is true, know what he meant when he says a thi.ng is red?" The 
answer must be no because he has no reliable criterion for a thing's 
bei.ng red. A person may argue, as Beloff implies, that the assertion 
that a thing is red means the color he is presently observi.ng, a red 
patch of somethi.ng. But since he is th~ only one who is aware of this 
patch his judgment cannot be checked and therefore cannot be said to 
be either r.ight or wro.ng. It cannot be said to meet or fail to meet 
a standard for color judgments. Hence, if it makes no sense to say of 
a factual judgment that it is neither right nor wrong, then this judg-
ment makes no sense. That is, a person himself cannot be sure when he 
says that a thi.ng is red if the color he is aware of is red or not. 
This means he cannot be said to know what red is or what "red" means. 
And this is the predicament in which Beloff's theory of perception 
leaves us. 
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Now consider Beloff's second argument, that since most people see 
color changes along a color continuum at about the same place we prob-
ably all see the same colors. This only means that most people have an 
ability to discriminate between colors. But does not the fact that we 
can tell if two observers can discriminate between colors at the same 
place on a continuum presuppose a public criterion for their doing so. 
Consider this: 
If language is to be a means of conununication there must be 
agreement not only in definition but also (queer as this 
may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but 
does not do so. · --It is one thing to.describe methods . of 
measurement, and another to obtain and state results of 
measurement. But what we call 'measuring' is partly deter-
mined by a certain constancy in results· of measurement. 5 
This means that if we are to use words with sense, as a source of 
conununication, there must be rules for correct and incorrect use and, 
,. 
further, .agreement in our judgments. This, ·agreement in judgments is n. . 
important, for people must agree overwhelmingly about what they notice . . 
or observe; for example, that the phone rang, that the lights went out 
or that a thi.ng is red. People who consistently dis.agree in such judg-
men ts could not speak the same langu.age. This agreement in language 
is an .agreement about what to say and this of course is necessary for 
. ' d t 6 .agreement 1n JU: gmen s. But this is just what cannot take place in a 
private world. If we teach someone (a child perhaps) color words, our 
criterion for his learning these words is his identifying colors cor-
rectly, his ability to discriminate between colors and shades of the 
same color. But Beloff cannot admit we have such a criterion because 
on his view the colors each of us is aware of are hidden. He, if he 
accepts this criterion, must say something like this: "Yes, that is 
our criterion for a person's knowi.ng what red is, but still, we cannot 
ever be sure he really knows. 11 So Beloff is forced by his theory to 
deny the factors that make l~ng~age possible. 
Thus we can conclude that at best the Representative Theory of 
perception leads to .agnosticism in regard to the color ju.dgments of 
others; ,but in reality, such a theory precludes an incli vi dual from 
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CHAPTER V 
WHEN WE LOOK AROUND, WHAT ACTUALLY DO WE PERCEIVE? 
We have, up to this point, been chiefly concerned with Beloff' s 
theory of perception and the arguments which he claims necessitates 
such a theory. I would like now to focus our attention on the basic 
direction that Beloff has taken in his approach to perception. What I 
wish to say of th:i.s direction is that it can be misleading and that with-
out this particular orientation toward perception Beloff might not have 
held the theory of perception that he does. The reader wi 11 recall 
that he began his investigation by posing this question as an opening 
gambit: 11When we look around or listen to what is going on, what actu-
ally is it that we perceive?" (p. 56) His immediate answer is that we 
perceive what is there, b~t after due deliberation on the matter he 
argues we must amend our answer to say that we have percepts which 
mediate our perceiving what is there.· He speaks of distinctions be-
tween an "object as it is 11 and an 11 object as it appears to be.'' He fur-
ther distinguishes phenomenal.objects and properties from physical 
ones; and so it becomes plain that he engages in an object analysis of 
what we perceive. The question I wish to consider here is: Is an ob-
ject analysis of perception an accurate analysis? 
Here then consider some of the different kinds of answers with 
which one can reply to the question as to what we see or hear when we 
look around or listen to what is going on. Some possible answers are: 
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(1) thi.ngs (not necessarily Beloff's physical or material things), how 
thi.ngs are done or how to do thi.ngs, why things happen, whether things 
happen; (2) events, happenings, performances; (3) qualities or proper-
ties; (4) relations; (5) states or conditions; and (6) facts. This list 
is by no means exhaustive and already we can see that our perceptions 
are many and varied. 1 And how many of these different accounts of per-
ception conform well to an object analysis? That is, which of these 
answers, any or all, involve our perceiving objects and could be 
accurately accounted for by describing objects? We may ask then "what 
is it like to see objects?" or "when do we report seeing objects?" In 
the case of s.ighting something in the distant sky, one person may call 
another's attention to it, saying something like: "Do you see that 
object up there. (pointing), what is it?" We refer to unidentified 
things as objects, we even have a standard expression, unidentified 
flying objects. A radar technician picks up objects on his radar 
screen, but when they are identified as a particular squadron or enemy 
planes, they are no longer objects. That is, we no lo.nger refer to 
them as objects, they have been identified an~ given another more 
accurate name. In. general; "object" is used when what is sensed cannot 
be named or identified. "Thi.ng" too is a. general term like "object," 
but is used somewhat differently from "object." We tell our children 
to keep thi.ngs put in the:i.r place in their room, we do not ordinarily 
them to keep their objects in their place. Here we could, if we de-
sired, name all the things invblved, for example, "keep your toys put 
away while not usi.ng them, your clothes, etc. . . . , " but we do not 
need to enumerate; "thi.ngs" works out very well. So "thi.ng" is a gen-
eral term that we use to refer 'to thi.ngs we could name individually, 
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but on the particular. occasion in question it is not necessary. The uses 
of "thi.ng" and "object 11 no doubt overlap, but.they can be distinguished. 
The important point for us to keep in mind is that while everything we 
perceive can in some instances be referr~d to as a thi.ng or an object, 
not everythi.ng we see is a thi.ng or object every time we see it. This 
means, of course, that an object analysis of perception may be m.islead-
i.ng. 
Max Hocutt offers a solution to what he calls the 11paradox of per-
ception." This "paradox" consists of those instances of seeing double, 
after images, illusions, etc., which sense data were created to explain. 
He looks at this problem as a verbal problem and one in which the .dis-
tinction of a class of mental entities is not the only way out. lie 
offers instead a distinction between a "primary.use" and a "secondary . . . . . 
use" of the question "what,: do you perceive?". The. prima:ry use is not 
usually a question about p1;1rceiving and so it cannot be a question about 
the objects of perceivi.:ng, that is, the question, "what do you perceive?" 
is not a question about percepti01;1. Hocutt s.uggests .. we amend such quesr-, 
ti·ons to a specific form, for ex~ple,. what do you perceive when you per,"." 
ceive an x? That is, "what did you s.ee at the ball. iame?" "What have 
you heard about Larry?" "Do the pickles taste sweet?" and other ~.imi-
lar questions are not questions ab.o!;ft perception and therefore cannot 
be questions about the obje~ts of perception. Then. the secondary use 
is a question about perception, but not about the oqjects of perception. 
These la~t mentioned questions are typically employed by a tester in a . . 
color-blind test, such as the dot test in which numbers are formed by 
dots and the subject in the test is asked to report what, if any, num-
bers he. sees. This. question is about .perception, right enc.ugh, 
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specifically what kind of perception is going on, normal or color-blind, 
but it is not about objects of perception. The question "what do you 
perceive?" is not asking about the objects of perception mainly due to 
the fact that our perceptions do not have objects. This means that 
there are objects of the verb "perceive," but these are. grammatical ob-
jects not objects of a perceptual process which Beloff is supposi.ng 
them to be. Hence, if we dispense with thinking that we continually 
. , 
perceive objects we will also dispense with the idea of needing a men-
tal object to exist where there is not a real object, as in the case of 
illusion and double vision. 2 The point I shall try to emphasize in what 
follows is that what we perceive cannot be mental objects because what 
we perceive are not objects. The question, which Beloff asks, as to 
what we perceive, is- another formulation of the question as to what the 
word "perceivell means,. or is to ask what is involved in the concept of 
perception. We will then need' to look closely at thEf different kirid of 
answers one could give to such· a question. 
In order to further explain Hocutt's idea of the primary use of· 
perceptual quest;i.ons, we will need to look closely at the use of per-
ceptual statements (statements involvfng a verb of perception), espe-
cially the list Warnock has compiled which appeared at the b.eginning of 
this chapter and which is a list of possible answers to Beloff's ques~ 
tion. In explicati.ng some of the meani.ngs of these uses of perceptual 
verbs, I borrow heavily from the work of.Arthur Collins in an article 
which appeared in the Philosophical Review. His thesis in this work is 
that perception is not the acquisition of knowle.dge and does. not consist 
of knowle.dge, belief, or ju.dgment. He holds that knowle.dge is external 
to the concept of perception its elf .. 3 ' If he is r.ight, if perception is 
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not a knowle.dge claim, then it cannot be a claim to knowle.dge of objects 
either. Now I do not wish to become involved here in defending his 
thesis, for I am not as yet convinced he is entirely correct. But much 
of the work he does in analyzing perceptual concepts is relevant to my 
purpose in this chapter, apart from whether he has or has not estab~ 
lished his thesis. 
First, consider perceptual verbs with propositional clauses for 
objects, "seeing that ... " clauses. One answer to Beloff's question 
of what we see could be "I see that ... "; and we need to see what sort 
of a claim is involved here. Look at the difference, for example, be-
tween "I see that there are pecan trees on this lanq." and "I see the 
pecan trees on this land." The first use of "see" here has a proposi-
tional object and makes a knowledge claim, however, it does not make 
a perceptual claim. 4 We might imagine such a statement as a comment, 
by a prospective buyer, on the value of a section of land. This is, 
however, not a report on perceptions. Now the second use of "see" does 
not involve a propositional object. We might imagine this latter sen-
tence as an affirmation to someone giving instructions that the listener 
does see the pecan trees, can pick them out, will not mistake them for 
Black Jack, and so forth. That is, someone may give instructions to 
proceed to the pecan grove and turn north, then ask "do you see the 
pecan trees?" the answer then comes, "yes," which means "I see the 
pecan trees." Now this is not expressly a perceptual report any more 
than the first use. Here "trees" is the grammatical object of "see," 
but this does not entail that the tree is the object of perception in 
the sense that perceiving the tree is an action on it, for it does not 
affect the tree. We have already seen how Beloff treated the double 
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vision example. We say: 11 ! see two trees. 11 The word "trees" is the 
grammatical object of the verb "see," but he also supposed there must 
be a further object to be the object of my perception, the second tree. 
This led him to the conclusion that there must be mental entities. 
But, as we have just seen, the verb "see11 has only a grammatical object, 
there is no other. What I am trying to expose here is the difference 
between perceptual verbs with objects and other action verbs. To cut 
down a tree there must be a tree to cut; here "tree" is the object of 
the verb "cut" and an object of the cutting action, in that the tree 
falls. But to say we see or perceive a thing is not in itself abso-
lutely sufficient grotinds for the thing's existence. To say, "I cut 
down a tree that does not eixst," is peculiar at best, but to say, "I 
saw two trees where there was only one," is not; for we understand that 
there can be optical illusions, and so forth. So all there need be 
with perceptual verbs are grammatical objects, not real objects, and 
the existence of mental objects can not be substantiated by an object 
analysis of perception. 
Now consider other kinds of perceptual verbs than visual, like 
"taste" and "smell." These verbs do not normally take a propositional 
object, that is, we do not smell that bacon is cooking or taste that 
the ice cream is champagne sherbert. What is standard would be that 
"I see we are having bacon; and to say this one need not literally see 
it. Likewise, one might say, "I see we are having champagne sherbert 
for dessert,n and again, one.need not see this with his eyes. These 
kinds of statements are not usually perceptual reports and so are not 
reports of having perceived objects. Verbs like "hear" and "feel" do 
take propositional objects, but they are not objects of perception. 
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Instances of "I feel that . • . " and "I hear that . . • " clauses are 
not perceptual reports, but rather statements of opinions or rumors. 
The use of "feel" and "hear" with propositional clauses implies that I 
do not know, just as such use of "see" implies that I do know. The 
point being that the propositional use of "see," "hear'' and "feel" are 
not perceptual uses. These three sentences bring this point out. 
(1) "I saw that the butler murdered her." 
(2) "I heard that the butler murdered her." 
(3) "I felt that the butler murdered her." 
These sentences would not normally be used by a witness to the murder. 
The conclusion here is then, that many of the uses of the verb "see" 
and all of the uses of "hear" and "feel" with propositional clauses do 
not make statements about perception, but rather indicate the speaker's 
conviction about the proposition introduced by the that . clause. 
Also, that what I know by. taste and smell can be expressed by a "see" 
expression (bacon example) with a propositional object, and that the 
resul ti.ng expression does not ref er to a visual perception. So it 
turns out that of the verbs which express perception only the verb 
"see" gives rise to the kind of objects that we might construe as mak-
i.ng a perceptual claim. 5 The point for my purposes bei.ng the· elimina-
tion of many of our expressions usi.ng perceptual verbs, mostly expres-
sions of facts, like "the fact that . . . . ", as perceptual claims; and 
hence, such expressions 'cannot be analyzed into objects of perceptions. 
This means they cannot support Beloff' s a.rguments for a Representative 
Theory of perception, since he arrives at such a theory by an object 
analysis of perceptual statements. 
We now need to consider those cases of the perceptual uses of 
"see" with quality words for objects. Warnock uses this example: 
Consider a simple case of what we called, with hesitation, 
seeing a quality, for example seeing the colour of Lloyd 
George's tie. it is clear that orie could not rightly say 
that one.saw the colour of his tie, if one did ·not get to 
know at the time what colour it was,6 
The point bei.ng, I take it, that we do not see qualities as isolated 
objects, but rather we see them as qualities of somethi_ng. A qua,lity 
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is not something we can see and not realize what it is, it is not like 
seei_n~ a distant unidentifiable obje~t. Collins attempts further ex-
planation of questions about qualities by seeking a context for such .. . 
questions. That is, in what situat~ons would quality words be the ob-
ject of t11,e verb "see?" When would we ask, "Did you see the color of 
Lloyd George's tie?" We might say this if the color is inappropriate 
for the occasion, perhaps a red tie at a funeral. Then the reply might. 
be, "yes, shocki_ng." Or if the color was a prearranged means of iden,,. 
tification, then the reply might be "yes; that is our contact," or "yes, 
I saw that it .was red." But the reply would never be; .III saw the red 
of his tie." A negative answer might be, "No, I did.not notice," or 
"I could not see, his back was towards me;: _but never "No, I saw the 
tie, but not the color of it." (This remark could possibly be used to 
say I just did not notice his tie, but not to mean I noticed his tie 
bµt not its color.) These diverse answers to the question of whether 
or not a certain person saw a particular quality bri_ng out the point 
that the question about qualities is an invitation to state what the 
qualities are or to admit that one cannot do so. These questions 
naturally presuppose the ans~er will be ba~ed on one's perception in 
the sense that one can describe the object tn question only because he 
has perceived it. But, the artswers. giv~n are not accounts of percep-
tion or reports of perce.ption. 7 The quality itself is not the object 
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of a perception verb. That is, redness is not an object of any percep-
tual activity because redness is not an object and our uses of quality 
words with perception verbs does not tr'eat them as such. And so, it 
turns out that our quality statements do not lend themselves very well 
to the object analysis to which Beloff subjects them. 
Several uses of perceptual verbs were mentioned at the beginning 
of this chapter, and by now we have discussed most of them; seeing 
things, objects, facts expressed in "that" clauses and other uses of 
"that" clauses, qualities, and relations (discussed in Chapter III). 
Two other possible answers to Beloff's question as to what we see were 
mentioned, seeing states or conditions and seeing events. What would 
it be like to see a state or condition? To see a state is to see the 
state of something, like the state of the union or the condition of an 
automobile. These kinds of things generally resolve themselves into 
the statement of a series of facts. For example, to see the state of 
the union is to see that there is excess government spending, that gun 
legislation is needed, and so forth. To see the state or condition of 
an automobile is to see that it does or does not need the brakes ad-
justed, repainted, overhauled, new tires, etc. The majority of these 
states do not resolve into perceptual claims let alone claims to know 
objects by perception. 
And then what is it like to report seeing an event. This notion 
usually suggests a.definite time and place as opposed to a.fact or con-
dition. It is a fact that President Eisenhower was not impeached. 
This is not an event, if it were, we could ask when it took place, 
what led up to it and so forth. We give accounts of events and some-
times record those that are noteworthy. We may tell someone of a 
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sequence.of strange events that t9ok place and so on. These are rarely 
perceptual reports at all, that is, many of our accounts would be from 
history books, things we have been told, etc. But what of.those eye 
witness accounts where we tell someone what we saw or what happened? 
Here 1;1.gain we have a case where what happened is the grammatical object 
of the verb "see, 11 but is not itself an object ora series of objects 
as we are to suppose.it must be if we accept Beloff's account. Such an 
account would be expressed in terms of phenomenal qualities and objects, 
percepts and primary qualities. So t90; we can conclude, that an 
account of events on an object analysis would be misleading_. 
We have now considered many different uses of perceptual verbs and 
it is surely obvious that in those uses of such verbs which are actu~ 
ally perceptual it would be wrong to say that what we perceive are ob-
jects. In fact, in those cases where we do report perceiving objects, 
instead of claiming tc, know these objects by perception we are rather 
admitting that we do not know them:, this is why we report perceiving 
objects rather than naming what we perceive. That is, generally when 
we refer to something as an object it is either because we are unable 
to say what it is or we are simply referring to a large group of things 
that need no individual identification. from this it can be concluded 
that the object analysis of our perceptions which Beloff em?loys to 
advance his Representative Theory is a misleading approach to percep-
tion and can only produce erroneous results. 
Recall again Beloff's original question: "When we look around 
what actually is it that we perceive?" (my italics) This actually is 
to emphasize what we really see as opposed to what we.think we see. 
This implies then· that there is some good reason for doubting the 
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authenticity of what we see. We have previously examined his objec-
tions to our "seei.ng what _is there" and found them lacki.ng in logical 
force. We have just completed several trial answers to this question 
to see if we could find a basis for positing perceptual objects such as! 
percepts and phenomenal objects, and our search failed to find such a 
basis, But we were working on this question without the actually_in 
it. We considered the question "what do you perceive?" not "what do 
you actually perceive?" Now I am at somewhat of a loss as to howl am 
supposed to answer this question for l do not understand its meaning, 
I can imagine times and places in which I would know how to respond to 
the first form of the question. For instance, if I were an aidto a 
policeman on the homicide squad and we approach the scene of a murder 
and as we approach I am told by my superior, "Look around and tell me 
what you see." I understand I am to look for possible murder weapons, 
evidences, or clues to the identity of the perpetrator and so forth. 
And I likewise understand the old business tycoon with whom I am visit ... 
ing in the middle of a large metropolitan area when he says,_"Look 
around, what do you see?n and I rEi)ply, "Large new buildings; factories, 
industry, busy people, automobiles stack,edup at intersecti,.ons, 11 and .so 
forth. Then he repliE;lS , "Yes, and it was just thirty years ago that 
this city was hardly a wide spot on the road. . . " and now I know he.· 
used the question to inti:oduce the topic of old memories, .to reminisce. 
But Beloff is not doing anything like this nor is he asking for a 
scientific explanation of perception nor, . I wish to say, anything which 
is intelligible to us. 
Consider this: We are teaching a young person about the relativ-
ity of velocity and use the following for illustration. Take a train 
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traveHng at a velocity of one hundred miles per hour across the desert. 
A man is running along the top of.the train at fifteen miles per hour 
relative to the train. This comes to, .if we have a fifteen mile long. 
train and the man started running from the caboose at the constant 
rate.mentioned_above, he would reach the engine car in one hour. Thus 
the man would have traveled :fifteen miles across the.top of the train 
while traveHng one hundred and fifteen: miles across the land due.to 
the combined velocities of the·train, one hundred miles per hour, and 
of the man, fifteen miles per hour. So we explain that velocity is 
relative to some reference point. Now suppose the child then asks, 
11How fast is the man actually traveling,"-or "How fast is he really 
traveHng." Now we must further explain that all velocities exce}?t 
one, the speed of light being absolutely 186,000 miles per second, are 
relative, that the man is traveHng fifteen miles per hour relative to 
the eart~ and that if we should like to expand our reference points,. 
say to the.center of the earth, we must take account of the fact that 
the surface of the earth is traveling about one thousa~d miles per hour 
relative to its center and so if we wish to calculate the velocity of 
the man on the train relative to the center of the earth we must now 
add or subtract, depending on the,direction of the train and man, his 
velocity to that of the earth's relative to the center. Now we can 
calculate velocities relative to many points; e.g. the sun, other 
planets, various stars and so forth, all we need do is specify our 
reference point. But to ask.what is the real or true speed of the man 
is a spurious question, since we have no accepted standard of reference, 
therefore to call some thing an absolute true and ultimate standard 
without major overhaul of p~esent scientific theories of velocities 
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will be purely contrived on our part and hence meaningless. Now I con-
ceive Beloff's question about perception to be much like this one. He 
asks what one actually sees when he looks around and does so wholly 
apart from any context which could lend sense to his question. The only 
sense he can supply is contrived and therefore meaningless. We have no 
criterion or standard for what we really see apart from a context which 
lends some doubt that we ought to accept what we see as valid and some 
standard for attaini.ng the correct answers to our questions. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
We initiated our investigation of Beloff's Theory of Perception 
by scrutinizing his arguments against Direct Realism. They were five 
in number, which I feel need not be enumerated again. The conclusion 
was that these arguments were either irrelevant to Beloff's purpose or 
misconceived. Either way, they entail nothing to preclude the perceiv-
ing of physical objects. We then looked at diff;i.culties which Beloff' s 
Representative Theory encountered with the meaning of color statements. 
We saw that in spite of arguments to the contrary, such a theory could 
not avoid solipsism; and further, that in a private world of experience 
certain sensation assertions have no meaning. Finally, we examined 
Beloff's general approach to perception, his opening gambit; "When we 
look around or listen to what is going on, what actually is it that we 
perceive?" We discovered that on his theory we do not see anything. 
Upon critical examination we also discovered that this question, (at. 
least the way Beloff employed it) was in one sense misleading, in that 
an answer in terms of objects was anticipated when we in fact do not 
ordinarily perceive objects. Then in another sense the question was 
found to be spurious. For all these reasons we can conclude that 
Beloff's version of perception cannot be correct and that he has not 
provided any grounds for our accepting his theory. 
The conclusions reached in this thesis of course apply specifical-
ly to Beloff's theory. There are other forms of a Representative 
Theory advanced by various philosophers. Perhaps some other versions 
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of this approach could avoid some of the difficulties Beloff encounters, 
However, it seems to me that any theory which places us in a private 
world of experience, whether we experience percepts, sense-data, or 
whatever, will encounter insurmountable difficulties with regard to 
the meaning of different kinds of sense-experience judgments. For this 
reason it.becomes apparent that any theory other than Direct Realism 
is untenable. 
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